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MEDELLÍN AND ORIGINALISM 
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗ 
In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court permitted Texas to proceed 
with the execution of a Mexican national who had not been given timely 
notice of his right of consular notification and consultation in violation 
of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations.  It did so despite its finding that the United States 
had an obligation under treaty law to comply with an order of the 
International Court of Justice that Medellín’s case be granted review 
and reconsideration.  The international obligation, the Court found, was 
not domestically enforceable because the treaties at issue were not self-
executing.  The five Justices who signed the Chief Justice’s Majority 
opinion, including the Court’s self-proclaimed originalists, thus joined 
an opinion that construed the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause without 
any serious consideration of its language or the history of its drafting, 
ignoring evidence of the Supremacy Clause’s original meaning cited by 
the dissenting Justices. 
This Article explores the meaning of originalism in the context of the 
Court’s Medellín decision and contends that the Majority’s opinion, 
while perhaps defensible on other grounds, cannot be reconciled with 
any identifiable version of originalism.  Rather it is best understood as a 
decision reflecting the conservative Majority’s political commitment to 
favor principles of U.S. sovereignty and federalism over compliance with 
international obligations, even when the consequences of such a 
commitment is to enable state governments to undermine the foreign 
policy decisions of the political branches of the federal government. 
Ultimately, however, the Article concludes that Medellín’s case 
never should have come before the Court.  The President has a duty to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  The Court determined 
that the Bush administration did not satisfy this duty by issuing an 
Executive Memorandum directing states to comply with the judgment of 
the International Court of Justice.  That being the case, the President 
now must comply with his Take Care Clause duties by working with 
Congress to make certain that federal law compels compliance with the 
International Court of Justice’s judgment.  Indeed, this Article contends 
that the Medellín case is emblematic of the U.S. executive branch’s 
broader failure to ensure that all treaties requiring domestic 
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implementation are in fact implemented so as to avoid placing the United 
States in violation of its international obligations.   
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[O]riginalism is not, and ha[s] perhaps never been, the 
sole method of constitutional exegesis.  It would be hard to 
count on the fingers of both hands and the toes of both feet, 
yea even on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions 
that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the 
Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what the 
judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean. . . .  But 
in the past, nonoriginalist opinions have almost always had 
the decency to lie, or at least to dissemble about what they 
were doing – either ignoring strong evidence of an original 
intent that contradicted the minimal recited evidence of an 
original intent congenial to the court’s desires, or else not 
discussing original intent at all, speaking in terms of broad 
constitutional generalities with no pretense of historical 
support.1 
                                                 
1
  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 
(1989). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Justice Scalia knows whereof he speaks.  In Medellín v. Texas,2 
the U.S. Supreme Court found that Texas was entitled to ignore the 
ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Avena case3 
as well as a Presidential memorandum directing states to comply 
with that ruling [hereinafter President’s Memorandum].4  The 
Court thus permitted Texas to proceed with the execution of a 
Mexican national who had not been given timely notice of his right 
of consular notification and consultation in violation of the United 
States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR).5  
                                                 
2
  Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008). 
3
  Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 
31). 
4
  Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. 
Att’y Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/ 20050228-18.html (last 
visited June 12, 2008).  The entire text of the memorandum is as follows: 
SUBJECT: Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of 
Justice in Avena  
 
The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (the "Convention") and the Convention's Optional Protocol 
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional 
Protocol), which gives the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
jurisdiction to decide disputes concerning the "interpretation and 
application" of the Convention.  
 
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that 
the United States will discharge its inter-national obligations under the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of 
America) (Avena), 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by having State courts give 
effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in 
cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.  
GEORGE W. BUSH  
5
  Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77,  T.I.A.S. no. 6820.  See id., Art. 
36(1)(b) (providing that, at the request of a foreign national criminal defendant, 
“the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the 
consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of 
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It did so without serious consideration of the Supremacy 
Clause, which reads:  
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof: and all Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the Untied 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.6 
One would think that the Court would put some energy into 
explaining why, in this case, a state court must be permitted to 
allow state procedural laws prohibiting successive habeas 
petitions7 to trump a treaty, in this case the U.N. Charter,8 Article 
94 of which requires member states to comply with decisions of 
the ICJ. 9  Its holding, in the end, turns on the extra-constitutional 
doctrine that some treaties are non-self-executing and therefore are 
not supreme law in the United States unless implemented through 
congressional legislation.10  But the  opinion makes no effort to 
square the doctrine of self-execution with the original meaning of 
                                                                                                             
that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is 
detained in any other manner”).  The ICJ found that the U.S. had violated its 
Article 36 obligations with respect to Avena and other Mexican nationals, 
including Medellín.  See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 71-72, ¶ 153 (finding, by a vote 
of fourteen to one, that the United States had violated its obligations under 
Article 36(1) of the VCCR). 
6
  U.S. Const. art. VI, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
7
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356 (reviewing the procedural history of Medellín’s 
case and noting that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had found that 
“neither the Avena decision nor the President’s Memorandum  was ‘binding 
federal law’ that could displace the State’s limitations on the filing of successive 
habeas applications”).   
8
  59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No. 993 (1945). 
9
  Id. at Art. 94(1) (requiring member states to “undertake to comply” with 
decisions of the ICJ). 
10
  See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356 (noting that “[t]his Court has long 
recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as 
domestic law and those that . . . do not” and citing to Justice Marshall’s 1828 
opinion in Foster v. Neilson, 22 Pet. 253, 315 (1829), as explaining the 
doctrine).  
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the Supremacy Clause,11 and it ignores historical legal scholarship 
cited by the dissent that suggests that the purpose of that clause 
was to guarantee that most treaties would be self-executing.12 
By joining the  opinion in Medellín, the Supreme Court’s two 
self-proclaimed originalists, Justices Scalia13 and Thomas,14 as 
                                                 
11
  See infra Part IV. 
12
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1378 (Breyer, J., dissenting), citing Carlos Vázquez, 
The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995); 
Martin Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original 
Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2095 (1999).  Justice Breyer also includes a “but see” citation to John Yoo, 
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original 
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999).  Yoo’s article, along with John 
Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-
Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) and JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF 
WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 215-49 
(2005), could have provided an originalist argument in support of the Majority’s 
opinion, were the Majority interested in making such arguments.  In any case, 
scholars have rejected Yoo’s arguments.  See, e.g., D.A. Jeremy Telman, The 
Foreign Affairs Power: Does the Constitution Matter? 80 TEMP. L. REV. 245, 
283 (2007) (noting that Yoo’s views on self-execution are without support in the 
historical record); Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign 
Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1450, 1451 (2006) (concluding that Yoo “drifts too 
far from the Framers’ expressed understandings of their own text, and from the 
historical meanings of the words they used”); Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing 
Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J. 1213, 1232, n. 75 (2005) (characterizing Yoo’s 
position as “in tension with the plain language” of the Supremacy Clause, “not 
widely endorsed” and having “little judicial support”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, 
Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2161 (1999) (finding not a 
shred of evidence to support the view that the Framer’s intended for the House 
of Representatives to have the power to block treaties in force); Flaherty, 
History Right, 99 COLUM. L. REV. at 2120-21 (reviewing records of the 
Constitutional Convention and finding them to support the notion that treaties 
were to be presumptively self-executing). 
13
  Justices Scalia and Thomas are routinely identified as originalists.  See, e.g., 
Stephen Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, unpublished manuscript, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009393 (last visited Apr. 
11, 2008), at 10 (describing Justices Scalia and Thomas as “conservative 
originalists) (cited with permission of the author); Mitchell N. Berman, 
Originalism is Bunk, unpublished manuscript, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1078933 (last visited Apr. 
11, 2008), at 1 (identifying Justices Scalia and Thomas as originalists).  Justice 
Scalia has proclaimed himself an originalist in innumerable contexts.  See e.g., 
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well as Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts who, in their Senate 
confirmation hearings “evinced sympathy for the originalist 
position,”15 are complicit in a return to what Justice Scalia 
ironically dubbed the “decent” judicial opinions of the past, in 
which judges dissemble about what they are doing, not discussing 
                                                                                                             
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2303 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
proper course of constitutional interpretation is to give the text the meaning it 
was understood to have at the time of its adoption by the people.”); Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2139 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I take it to be a 
fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication that the terms of in the 
Constitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the time of their 
ratification.”).      
14
  Justice Thomas has expressly embraced originalism in Clarence Thomas, 
Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (reiterating a position expressed in his 
written opinions that “judges should seek the original understanding of the 
[constitutional] provision’s text, if that text’s meaning is not readily apparent”).  
Indeed, Thomas has repeatedly invoked originalism as his preferred method of 
interpretation in his legal opinions.  See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 
2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that 
public schools may prohibit speech advocating illegal drug use but writing 
separately to stress that the First Amendment, as originally understood, does not 
protect student speech in public schools); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 
115 S.Ct. 1511, 1525 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (concurring in the result 
but reaching it by means of an inquiry into whether “the phrase ‘freedom of 
speech, or of the press,’ as originally understood, protected anonymous political 
leafletting”); Helling v. McKinney,113 S.Ct. 2475, 2484 (1993) (Thomas, Scalia 
JJ., dissenting) (finding, based on the original meaning of “punishment,” that the 
petitioners cannot not rely on the Eighth Amendment to protest prison 
conditions).   Scholars have noted the originalist cast of Justice Thomas’s 
jurisprudence.  See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN 
HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN CONSERVATISM 260 (2004) (characterizing 
Justice Thomas as making the most extensive originalist case for expanding 
judicially enforceable limits on congressional power). 
15
  Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? Due 
Process Procedural Innovation and . . . Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2007), citing Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., 
to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 357 (2006) (statement of 
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and 
Nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination 
of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 159, 570 (2005) (statement and 
written response of John G. Roberts, Jr., J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, and Nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court). 
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original intent or original meaning at all, and decide cases in 
accordance with their own views, with nary a pretense of historical 
support.16  In Medellín, it was the “living constitutionalists”17 who 
with one exception18 joined in Justice Breyer’s dissent.19  That 
dissent relied heavily on historical scholarship into the original 
meaning of the Supremacy Clause,20 and informed by that 
historical evidence and by case law largely ignored by the 
Majority, concluded that the Texas courts are bound, pursuant to 
the VCCR, the Optional Protocol to that Convention,21 and Article 
94 of the U.N. Charter, to implement the ICJ’s Avena decision.22  
                                                 
16
  Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 852. 
17
  Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer are often characterized as 
being in the living constitutionalist camp.  See, e.g., John C. Eastman, Politics 
and the Court: Did the Supreme Court Really Move Left Because of 
Embarrassment over Bush v. Gore? 94 GEO. L. J. 1475, 1481 (2006) (naming 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer as the court’s “living 
constitutionalists”); Eric R. Claeys, The Limits of Empirical Political Science 
and the Possibility of Living-Constitution Theory for a Retrospective on the 
Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 737, 749 (2003) (stating that Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer subscribe to an agenda of living 
constitutionalism essentially consistent with that of the Warren Court).  Justice 
Breyer has made his commitment to living constitutionalism more or less 
express in a recent publication, STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006).  In that book, Justice 
Breyer describes his own approach as seeking to avoid constitutional 
interpretations that are either “willful, in the sense of enforcing individual 
views,” that is simply enforcing “whatever [the judge] thinks best” or “wooden, 
in uncritically resting on formulas, in assuming the familiar to be the necessary, 
in not realizing that any problem can be solved if only one principle is involved 
but that unfortunately all controversies of importance involve if not a conflict at 
least an interplay of principles.”  Id. at 18, 19 (quoting Justice Frankfurter, 
Learned Hand and Justice Brandeis).   
18
  Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in Medellín, in which he relies 
only on the language of the relevant treaties in finding them to be non-self-
executing, without any reference to the original meaning of the Supremacy 
Clause.  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1372-73 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
19
  Id. at 1375 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
20
  See discussion infa Part IV.B.   
21
  Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on consular Relations 
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, done on Apr. 24, 1963 
[1970], 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. T.I.A.S. no. 6820. 
22
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1375 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the , did not engage this 
historical evidence in earnest, instead relying on his own 
idiosyncratic and poorly documented version of our constitutional 
history and judicial precedent23 in finding that the relevant treaties 
are all non-self-executing and therefore not enforceable as U.S. 
law absent congressional implementing legislation.24 
This Article explores the paradoxical refusal of the originalist 
Justices to even acknowledge the strong originalist arguments of 
the dissenting Justices in Medellín.  It thus contributes to the 
growing literature that exposes the inconsistency of the Court’s 
self-proclaimed originalists.25  It would be churlish to point out 
                                                 
23
  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
24
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356 (finding that because none of the treaties at 
issue in Medellín create binding federal law in the absence of implementing 
legislation and that no such legislation exists, the Avena judgment is not binding 
domestic law). 
25
  See, e.g., KECK, MOST ACTIVIST COURT, at 258 (arguing that the Rehnquist 
Court’s conservative majority relies only sporadically on originalist arguments 
in “activist” decisions); Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the 
Establishment Clause (forthcoming NORTHWEST. L. REV. (2008), draft posted at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=112482 (last visited June 12, 2008), manuscript at 2 
(arguing that Justices Rehnquist’s, Scalia’s and Thomas’s interpretations of the 
establishment clause “are remarkably indifferent to the original purposes of that 
clause”); Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning, 60 OKLA L. 
REV. at 25-26 (contending that Scalia’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause 
is not originalist); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of ‘Faint-
Hearted’ Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 12 (2006) (contending that Scalia 
simply discards constitutional provisions that do not meet with his approval).  
Indeed, there are scholarly attacks on Scalia’s consistency in interpretive 
strategies that go beyond constitutional interpretation.  See, e.g., Miranda Oshige 
McGowan, Do As I Do, Not As I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice 
Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, University of 
San Diego School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 08-15, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113541 (last visited June 15, 2008) 
(arguing that Scalia often departs from textualism in statutory interpretation and 
that in cases when he follows his purported methodology, he often finds, based 
on resort to an eclectic variety of extrinsic materials that the assumption in favor 
or the ordinary meaning of the statutory language is overcome); George H. 
Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321 (1995) (developing a 
positive account of the methodology of textualism – as opposed to viewing 
textualism simply as a critique of intentionalism – but concluding that 
textualism does not succeed in limiting or eliminating judicial discretion in 
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such inconsistency but for the fact that the originalist Justices have 
been outspoken in defending a version of originalism that they do 
not practice, and in his public statements on the subject Justice 
Scalia has posited a dichotomy between originalism and non-
originalism in which he himself does not believe.26  Such 
hypocrisy ought not to pass without scholarly comment.27  As 
                                                                                                             
statutory or constitutional interpretation); William D. Popkin, An “Internal” 
Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
1133, 1173-86 (1992) (rejecting Scalia’s argument that public respect for the 
courts is eroded when courts depart from the textualist approach and inquire into 
legislative intent); William Eskridge, The New Textualism  37 UCLA L. REV. 
621, 671 (1990) (“It does not readily appear that the structure and background of 
the Constitution support the new textualism over other theories of statutory 
interpretation.”).  
26
  See Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 862 (acknowledging that 
“there is really no difference between the faint-hearted originalist and the 
moderate nonoriginalist” and that “most originalists are faint-hearted and most 
nonoriginalists are moderate.”).  Scalia often claims that being an originalist is 
tough.  He does not just get to vote however he likes in every case.  Scalia 
illustrates this point with a story about his wife mockingly humming “It’s a 
Grand Old Flag” or “Stars and Stripes Forever” (the song changes; the story 
does not) for him when he comes down for breakfast the morning after joining 
in an opinion that permitted flag burning.  See, e.g., Transcipt: NPR News 
Morning Edition, April 28, 2008, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
Discusses His New Book, Being a Part of the McCain Dream Ticket and His 
Eternal Gratitude Towards President George H.W. Bush, 
http://www.npr.org/about/press/2008/042808.AntoninScalia.html (last visited 
June 11, 2008) (telling the “It’s a Grand Old Flag” story and noting, that “the 
living constitution jurist is always a happy fella because the case always comes 
out the way he thinks it ought to”); University Record Online, Scalia says to 
focus on original meaning of Constitution, Nov. 24, 2004, 
http://www.ur.umich.edu/0405/Nov22_04/13.shtml (last visited June 11, 2008) 
(reporting on the “Grand Old Flag” story and noting that being an originalist 
does not always make Scalia popular with conservatives); W&M News, Justice 
Antonin Scalia: The case for “dead Constitution”, Mar. 21, 2004, 
http://www.wm.edu/news/?id=3486 (last visited June 11, 2008) (quoting Scalia 
as contrasting his experience with that of the “living constitutionalist” and 
characterizing the latter’s position as “Whatever he thinks is good, is in the 
Constitution”). It is a nice story, but Scalia’s faint-hearted originalism permits 
him to vote as he likes with great regularity.   
27
  Another theme invoked by Justice Scalia and other originalists is that 
originalism is the only coherent approach to constitutional interpretation, unless 
one’s approach is nihilism.  See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, 
10 NAME OF JOURNAL 2008 
Mitchell Berman has recently argued, in at least some of its forms, 
originalism is, or can be, pernicious.28 
It is pernicious because of its tendency to be 
deployed in the public square – on the campaign 
trail, on talk radio, in Senate confirmation hearings, 
even in Supreme Court opinions – to bolster the 
popular fable that constitutional adjudication can be 
practiced in something close to an objective and 
mechanical fashion….  [T]here is little doubt that 
originalism is often used . . . to pander to that 
American populist taste for simple answers to 
complex questions.  By thus nourishing skepticism, 
even demonization, of judicial reasoning that cannot 
be reduced to sound bite, originalism threatens to 
undermine the judiciary’s unique and essential role 
in our system of government.29 
It is not the position of the Article that the proper result in 
Medellín should have been determined solely by giving effect to 
the Court’s understanding of the original meaning of the 
Supremacy Clause, although one certainly expects a constitutional 
case to be decided with some attention given to the constitutional 
text at issue and, if the text is unclear, to its ratification history.  
                                                                                                             
Originalism’s Living Constitutionalism, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090282 (last visited April 
12, 2008), manuscript at 1-2 (summarizing the views of originalists, including 
Justice Scalia, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Randy Barnett, Robert Bork, Edwin 
Meese III and Raoul Berger, all of whom content that originalism is the only 
consistent theoretical approach to constitutional interpretation).  Colby and 
Smith argue that originalism is, in fact, self-contradictory and incoherent and 
thus is no different from the living constitutionalism that originalists so abhor.  
See id. at 42-43 (characterizing originalism as “staggering array of sometimes 
inconsistent approaches which go a long way towards creating a living 
constitutionalism”).  See also Berman, Originalism is Bunk, at 11 (contending 
that “originalist logical space” can be represented by a matrix consisting of 72 
distinct theses). 
28
  Id. at 5. 
29
  Id. at 5-6. 
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Still, this Article maintains that, under the Take Care Clause,30 
cases such as Medellín should never arise if the executive branch is 
serious about its foreign affairs powers.  That is, part of the job of 
the executive is to make certain that the U.S. is in full compliance 
with its international obligations.  It must do so by taking whatever 
measures are necessary and effective to assure that such 
obligations are enforceable in domestic courts, wherever 
international obligations require such enforcement.  While the 
Medellín Majority permits the State of Texas to determine the 
foreign policy of the United States, the Supreme Court was in a 
position to permit Texas to do so only because successive 
presidential administrations lacked the political will to guarantee 
that VCCR rights (as well as innumerable other rights created 
under treaties ratified by the United States) are enforceable in U.S. 
courts. 
After a brief review of the background, facts and relevant 
procedural history of Medellín in Part II of the Article, Part III 
reviews the development of originalist doctrine, with a brief 
discussion of the commitment to original meaning associated with 
the positions of Justices Thomas and Scalia on the one hand and 
the non-originalist Justices on the other.  Part IV discusses the 
Medellín opinions in the context of historical scholarship on the 
meaning of the Supremacy Clause and the development of the 
doctrine of self-execution.  Part V offers a model for how the 
political branches might reconcile a properly historicized31 
approach to the Supremacy Clause32 and the Take Care Clause33 
regardless of the Court’s views of the doctrine of self-execution.34  
                                                 
30
  U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
31
  For a historicist critique of originalism, see STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 164-69 (1996); 
Griffin, Rebotting Originalism, at 35-43. 
32
  U.S. Const. art. VI, ¶ 2. 
33
  U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
34
  The opinion in Medellín also addresses the power of the President to direct 
state courts to implement a decision of an international tribunal.  On that subject, 
the constitutional text provides only the most general guidance and so a 
discussion of that part of the opinion would go beyond the scope of this Article.  
12 NAME OF JOURNAL 2008 
In brief, this Article argues that in order to avoid situations in 
which congressional inaction or state opposition creates tensions 
between U.S. obligations under international law and domestic 
law, the President must take care to use political and legal means 
to persuade Congress to make our international obligations 
enforceable as domestic law wherever compliance with a treaty 
demands congressional implementation. 
II.  THE MEDELLÍN CASE 
On June 24, 1993, José Ernesto Medellín, a Mexican national 
and a member of the “Black and Whites” street gang, participated 
in an attack on two Houston teenagers, Jennifer Ertman and 
Elizabeth Pena.35  Gang members raped the girls for over an hour 
and then murdered them to prevent them from identifying their 
attackers.36  Medellín himself strangled at least one of the girls 
with her own shoelace.37  Medellín was arrested five days later.  
Within hours of his arrest, he signed a written waiver and gave a 
detailed written confession.38  Before he made this confession, 
Medellín was advised of his Miranda rights.  He was not advised 
of his rights as a Mexican national under the VCCR to seek legal 
advice from the Mexican consulate.39  Medellín was convicted of 
capital murder and sentenced to death.  In 1997, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals upheld both Medellín’s conviction and his 
sentence.40 
Years later, while Medellín was on death row in Texas and his 
petition for habeas corpus worked its way through the federal 
courts,41 Mexico brought a case in the ICJ against the United States 
                                                                                                             
That part of the opinion is the subject of a separate article, Medellín and the 
State as Unitary Actor in International Legal Theory. 
35
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1354. 
36
  Id. 
37
  Id.  
38
  Id.  
39
  VCCR, Art. 36(1)(b); Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1353. 
40
  Id. at 1354-55. 
41
  Id. at 1355. 
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on behalf of Medellín42 and other Mexican nationals who were 
convicted in courts within the United States without being given 
the access to consul provided for in the VCCR.43  This case, known 
as Avena, was the third in a trilogy of cases brought before the ICJ 
by states whose nationals were facing the death penalty in the 
United States and who had been denied their VCCR rights.44   
In the first case,45 brought in April 1998, Paraguay instituted 
proceedings against the United States and sought a retrial of a 
Paraguayan national, Angel Francisco Breard, who had been 
sentenced to death in Virginia in 1993 but had been denied his 
consular consultation rights in connection with his arrest and 
prosecution for rape and murder.46  In 1996, Paraguay had also 
attempted to use domestic legal mechanisms to prevent Breard’s 
execution and to enjoin further violations of the VCCR.47  A 
Virginia District Court found that it did not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Paraguay’s claims.48  The Fourth Circuit affirmed 
                                                 
42
  Avena, 2004 I. C. J. Reports at 24-25, ¶ 16 (listing Medellín (#38) among 
the Mexican nationals on whose behalf Mexico sought relief).    
43
  Id. at 12.   The ICJ had jurisdiction over Avena pursuant to the Optional 
Protocol to the VCCR, which the United States ratified together with the VCCR 
itself in 1969, and which provides for jurisdiction in the ICJ for disputes arising 
under the VCCR.  Medellín, 128 S.Ct at 1353.  In response to the Avena 
decision, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol.  Letter from 
Condaleeza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, to Kofi Annan, United Nations 
Secretary-General, March 7, 2005, cited in Medellín, 128 S.Ct at 1354. 
44
  See John F. Murphy, Medellín v. Texas: Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Decision for the United States and the Rule of Law in International 
Affairs, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 247, 253-259 (recounting litigation 
relating to Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan sentenced to death for a 
murder committed in Virginia, and Karl and Walter LaGrand, West Germans 
sentenced to death for a murder committed in Arizona). 
45
  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) 1998 I.C.J. 249 
(Application of the Republic of Paraguay of Apr. 3, 1998). 
46
  Jonathan Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard: The Facts, 92 
AM. J. INT’L L. 666, 666-68 (1998). 
47
  Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F.Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
48
  See id. at 1273 (finding that the Eleventh Amendment deprives the court of 
subject-matter-jurisdiction over the relief sought by plaintiffs). 
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on the same ground,49 and the Supreme Court refused to review 
that decision.50 
On April 9, 1998, the ICJ voted unanimously to indicate 
provisional measures, directing the United States to ensure that 
Breard was not executed prior to the ICJ’s final decision.51  The 
response of the Clinton administration was ambivalent.  On the one 
hand, the Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of 
Virginia urging the Governor not to allow Breard’s execution to 
proceed.52  At the same time, the Clinton administration filed an 
amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court urging the Court to deny 
a writ of certiorari and a stay in Breard’s habeas petition on the 
ground that the ICJ’s provisional measures are not binding on the 
United States.53  By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court denied 
Breard’s petition for habeas corpus and for certiorari on April 14, 
1998.54  The Governor of Virgina refused to issue a stay of 
execution,55 and Breard was executed that same day.56  Paraguay 
eventually dropped its suit against the United States in the ICJ.57 
Within months of Paraguay’s withdrawal of its suit, Germany 
initiated a new action against the United States in the ICJ on behalf 
of two of its nationals, Walter and Karl LaGrand, who were facing 
                                                 
49
  See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not permit federal courts to provide 
a remedy based on state officials’ past violations). 
50
  Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998). 
51
  Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. 
U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1998 I.C.J. Reports 248, 258 (Apr. 9, 1998). 
52
  See Charney & Reisman, Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. at 671-72 
(quoting from Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to 
James S. Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998)). 
53
  See Charney & Reisman, Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. at 672-73 
(quoting from Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 49-51, Breard v. 
Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998)). 
54
  Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. at 1354. 
55
  See Charney & Reisman, Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. at 674-75 
(quoting from Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Press Office, 
Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard 
(Apr. 14, 1998)).  
56
  Murphy, Medellín v. Texas, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. at 257. 
57
  Id. 
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execution for a murder committed in Arizona in 1982.58 Although 
the LaGrands were tried and sentenced in 1984, the fact that they 
had been denied their VCCR rights did not come to light until 
1992.59  The Supreme Court denied their final habeas appeal in 
November 1998,60 after the Ninth Circuit had rejected their VCCR 
claim as procedurally defaulted.61  Karl LaGrand was executed on 
February 23, 1999, before Germany was able to initiate its suit in 
the ICJ.62 
Germany acted in time to permit the ICJ to issue a provisional 
measure to prevent the execution of Walter LaGrand as scheduled 
on March 3, 1999.63  Germany also had filed a suit in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but on the same day, the Court refused to exercise 
its original jurisdiction in the case.64  Despite a recommendation 
from Arizona’s Board of Executive Clemency that the Governor 
grant a sixty-day reprieve to allow for the sorting out of issues 
surrounding Germany’s ICJ case, Arizona Governor Jane Hull 
ordered the execution to proceed as scheduled,65 and Walter was 
executed later that evening.66   
Unlike Paraguay, Germany decided to pursue its case before 
the ICJ despite its inability to win a judgment that could benefit the 
LaGrand brothers.  Rather than seeking compensation for the harm 
it suffered as a result of the U.S. breach of its VCCR obligations, 
Germany sought assurances that further breaches would not 
occur.67  The Court, for the most part, granted Germany the 
                                                 
58
  See Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, The LaGrand Case: A Story of Many 
Miscommunications, in International Law Stories, 371, 380 (John E. Noyes, et 
al. eds., 2007) (stating that Germany filed its application with the ICJ on March 
2, 1999, the day before Walter LaGrand was scheduled to be executed). 
59
  Id. at 378. 
60
  LaGrand v. Stewart, 119 S.Ct. 422 (1998) (mem.). 
61
  LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998). 
62
  Simma & Hoppe, The LaGrand Case, at 379-80. 
63
  Murphy, Medellín v. Texas, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. at 258. 
64
  F.R.G. v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1016, 1017 (1999). 
65
  Simma & Hoppe, The LaGrand Case, at 380 
66
  Murphy, Medellín v. Texas, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. at 258. 
67
  LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), 2001 ICJ 466, 474, ¶ 12 
(Judgment of June 27, 2001) 
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remedy it sought, holding that the United States must allow review 
and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of foreign 
nationals who were denied their VCCR rights so as to take the 
violation into account, but it left the choice of means for so doing 
up to the United States.68 
It came as no surprise when the ICJ, in the Avena case, found 
that the United States had violated its obligations under the VCCR, 
just as it had found in the LaGrand case.69  Mexico sought a ruling 
from the ICJ ordering the United States to vacate the convictions 
and sentences of Mexico’s nationals convicted and sentenced in 
violation of the VCCR and suppression of any statement or 
confessions made by those Mexican nationals prior to notification 
of their VCCR rights.70  The ICJ opted for a more lenient penalty, 
requiring U.S. courts to “review and reconsider” the convictions 
and sentences of affected Mexican nationals to determine whether 
they had been prejudiced by the U.S. breach of its treaty 
obligations.71  The U.S. Supreme Court initially granted certiorari 
to hear Medellín’s VCCR claim on habeas,72 but then dismissed 
the petition for certiorari as improvidently granted in order to give 
the Texas courts an opportunity to provide the review and 
reconsideration called for in Avena.73 
This was necessary because, while Medellín’s habeas petition 
was pending before the Supreme Court, although the United States 
disagreed with the Avena decision,74 President Bush issued a 
                                                 
68
  Id. at 516, ¶ 128(7). 
69
  2004 I.C.J. Reports, at 53-55, ¶ 106.  See Simma & Hoppe, The LaGrand 
Case, at 388 (“The ICJ, faced with the same treaty and a substantially similar 
situation as in LaGrand . . . produced a judgment that was, to nobody’s surprise, 
very similar to its judgment in LaGrand.”). 
70
  2004 I.C.J. Reports, at 21, ¶ 13.  Mexico also sought a ruling prohibiting the 
United States from relying on any procedural penalty or any other domestic law 
in denying relief to Mexican nationals affected by the decision.  Id. at 21-22, ¶ 
13. 
71
  Id. at 72; Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1355. 
72
  Medellín v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 686 (2005) 
73
  Medellín v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (2005). 
74
  See Verbatim Record, Oral Proceedings in the Case Concerning the Request 
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning 
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memorandum to the Attorney General, stating that the United 
States would comply with the Avena judgment by directing state 
courts to implement that judgment.75  In Medellín’s case, the Texas 
criminal courts refused to do so.  The Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals dismissed Medellín’s post-Avena habeas petition as an 
abuse of the writ.76  The Texas court did not view either the Avena 
decision or the President’s Memorandum as capable of displacing 
state limitations on the filing of successive habeas applications.77  
In Medellín v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed.78  In a 
decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court concluded that 
“neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes 
directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on 
the filing of successive habeas petitions.”79  In so doing, the 
Medellín Majority found that the international obligations that 
might render the Avena decision “directly enforceable federal law” 
– the VCCR, its Optional Protocol and Article 94 of the United 
Nations Charter – were non-self-executing treaties that had never 
been implemented through congressional legislation.80   
That the five-member conservative  of the Court found that a 
decision of the ICJ does not trump state law surprised few, 
although some predicted that the Roberts Court, protective as it has 
been of the President’s foreign affairs powers, would order Texas 
                                                                                                             
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (United Mexican States v. United States of 
America) (Remarks of John Bellinger, June 19, 2008), at 10, ¶ 6, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14592.pdf (last visited July 17, 2008). 
75
  See President’s Memorandum, supra note 4. 
76
  Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
77
  Id.; Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356. 
78
  This holding, in and of itself, was not a surprise, given that the Court had 
already held that states may apply the procedural default rule to bar VCCR 
claims.  Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006).   
79
  Id. at 1357. 
80
  See id. (“Because none of these treaty sources creates binding federal law in 
the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no 
such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena judgment is not 
automatically binding domestic law.”). 
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to comply with President’s Memorandum.81  It is surprising that in 
reaching that conclusion, the Majority devotes so little attention to 
the original meaning of the constitutional text with regard to 
whether and when international agreements should be given direct 
effect as domestic law.  More surprising still, the Majority devotes 
very little attention to original meaning despite the fact that the 
non-originalist dissenters cite to the work of legal scholars who 
have explored the issue in great detail.82  While the Justices in the 
Majority are free to be unpersuaded by the work of mere 
academics, it is surprising that they do not even attempt to address 
the overwhelming evidence of an original meaning to the 
Supremacy Clause, enforced in dozens of cases listed in an 
                                                 
81
  See Julian Ku, Medellín Gets Yet Another Day at the Supreme Court: This 
Time He Should Win, Opinio Juris Blog, 
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1192028188.shtml (Oct. 10, 2007) (last visited 
June 11, 2008) (predicting that Medellín would prevail because of the 
President’s memorandum directing states to implement the ICJ’s Avena 
decision).  Ku’s prediction was supported by his own scholarship and that of 
others.  See Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 45-47 (2006) (contending that the President can implement 
international tribunal judgments pursuant to executive foreign affairs powers); 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance 
with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 679, 685-86 (1998) 
(contending that the President, pursuant to the Constitution’s Take Care Clause, 
could have ordered the effectuation of the ICJ’s provisional measures in the 
Breard case and thus prevented Breard’s execution). 
82
  See supra, note 12 (citing the works of Carols Vázquez and Martin 
Flaherty); see also Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571 (2007)).  The dissenters, in 
keeping with their refusal to embrace a principled originalism, do not base their 
position solely on the original meaning of the Constitution.  Rather, they also 
argue for a historical tradition of giving direct domestic effect to treaties that 
they are persuaded is consistent with the original meaning of the Supremacy 
Clause.  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1378-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  They also point 
to caselaw relating to claims settlements in which Presidents used their Article II 
power pursuant to a ratified treaty to set aside state law.  Id. at 1390-91.  The 
Majority opinion does respond to the dissent’s arguments relating to claims 
settlements.  Id. at 1371-72. 
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appendix to the dissenting opinion,83 at odds with the Majority’s 
ruling.   
III.  ORIGINALISM AND THE MEDELLÍN OPINIONS 
A. Varieties of Originalist Approaches to Constitutional 
Interpretation 
As an articulated theory of constitutional interpretation, 
originalism is of rather recent vintage.84  However, originalism has 
evolved, rapidly and with great contestation,85 and debates within 
originalism have become extremely complicated.86  Generations of 
scholars have now debated the original meaning of originalism.87  
                                                 
83
  See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1392-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing 29 
Supreme Court cases decided 1794 and 2004 in which the Court held a treaty to 
be self-executing, 12 of which involved enforcement of a treaty despite contrary 
state or territorial law or policy). 
84
  See, e.g., Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 12-13 (noting that various 
contemporary methods of non-originalist constitutional interpretation are rooted 
in traditions that extend back to the time of the adoption of the Constitution and 
were employed by Justice John Marshall); Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Origalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) (conceding that, for much 
of U.S. history, originalism “was not a terribly self-conscious theory of 
constitutional interpretation”). 
85
  Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 4-8 (summarizing the development of 
new originalism in the 1990s in response to the old originalism that arose in the 
1960s); Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 599 
(describing the old originalism as having flourished from the 1960s thorough the 
mid 1980s, while the new originalism has flourished since the early 1990s).  
Randy Barnett provides a remarkably concise and authoritative history of 
originalism.  Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. 
REV. 611, 611-13 (1999). 
86
  See Colby & Smith, Originalism’s Living Constitutionalism, at 4-5 (arguing 
that originalism is so conflicted as to be incoherent). 
87
  See, e.g., Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original 
Meaning, 86 GEO. L. J. 569 (1998) (criticizing Scalia’s view that originalism 
must entail fidelity to original practices and proposing an originalism committed 
to enforcing original principles embodied in the Constitution); Charles A. 
Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent? 5 CONST. COMM. 77 
(1989) (arguing that the Framers were “hospitable to the use of original intent in 
the sense of ratifier intent, which is the  original intent in a constitutional 
sense”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885, 888 (1985) (arguing that the original version of “original 
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The history of originalism has been recounted numerous times in 
recent scholarship.88  Because the topic has been so exhaustively 
covered elsewhere, a short summary is all that is called for here. 
To the extent that originalism can be reduced to its core, it 
consists of the view that “only certain sorts of historical evidence, 
such as the understandings of constitutional meaning of the 
Philadelphia framers or ratifiers of the Constitution, are legitimate 
in constitutional interpretation.”89  Originalists and non-originalists 
alike provide similar definitions.90  Parsimony is the key advantage 
of originalism as a theory of constitutional adjudication: the 
                                                                                                             
intent” focused not on the expectations of the framers but on the “rights and 
powers sovereign polities could delegate to a common agent without destroying 
their own essential autonomy,” making original intentionalism into a form of 
structural interpretation). 
88
  Excellent, succinct summaries can be found in Thomas B. Colby, The 
Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 529, 529-33 (2008); Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 599-603; Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 
LOY. L. REV. at 611-29.   Daniel Farber provides a concise narrative account of 
early originalism in Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1095 (1989). 
89
 Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 2.   
90
  See, e.g., Berman, Originalism is Bunk, at 3 (“[O]riginalism maintains that 
courts ought to interpret constitutional provisions solely in accordance with 
some feature of those provisions’ original character.”); Farber, The Originalism 
Debate, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. at 1086 (“Originalists are committed to the view that 
original intent is not only relevant but authoritative, that we are in some sense 
obligated to follow the intent of the framers.”); Paul Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980) 
(defining originalism as the “approach to constitutional adjudication that accords 
binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its 
adopters”); Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 851-52 (describing the 
“originalist” approach to constitutional interpretation as seeking to establish the 
meaning of the Constitution in 1789 based on the Constitution’s text and overall 
structure as well as the contemporaneous understanding of the relevant text); 
Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI-KENT L. REV. 
211, 220-21 (1988) (describing textualists such as Robert Bork as treating “the 
constitutional text as the sole legitimate source of operative norms of 
constitutional law”). 
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judge’s role is to discover the original meaning of the Constitution 
and rule in accordance with that meaning.91   
Originalism began as a response to the Warren and Burger 
Courts.92  Just as romantic conservatism evolved as a response to 
enlightenment rationalism,93 and just as modern conservatism in 
the United States emerged as a response to the perceived excesses 
of progressive movements from Roosevelt’s New Deal to the 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society,94 originalism was “a reactive 
theory”95 that sought to reign in judicial activism by forcing 
judicial attention to the original meaning of the Constitution.96  As 
such, the old originalism had a clear political agenda,97 and it 
assumed that its agenda could be realized if judges respected the 
wills of legislatures.98  That assumption now seems oddly 
                                                 
91
  See Colby & Smith, Originalism’s Living Constitutionalism, at 2 (“to 
originalists, it is the relative predictability, determinacy and coherence of the 
originalist approach that both respects law and constrains judges.”). 
92
  Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 4; Colby & Smith, Originalism’s Living 
Constitutionalism, at 5. 
93
  See H.G. SCHENK, THE MIND OF THE EUROPEAN ROMANTICS 3-8 (1966) 
(characterizing romanticism as a “reaction against rationalism”). 
94
  See GEORGE NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN 
AMERICA SINCE 1945 xii (1976) (defining American post-war conservatism as 
being animated by “resistance to certain forces perceived to be leftist, 
revolutionary and profoundly subversive of what conservatives at the time 
deemed worth cherishing, defending and perhaps dying for”); Jonathan Rieder, 
The Rise of the “Silent Majority,” in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL 
ORDER 243, 244 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle, eds., 1989) (attributing the rise 
of populist conservatism to feelings of resentment, betrayal and unhappiness 
with the cultural and political changes in American society from the New Deal 
to the civil rights movement). 
95
  See Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 601 
(“It is important to note that originalism was a reactive theory motivated by 
substantive disagreement with the recent and then-current actions of the Warren 
and Burger Courts.”); id. at 604 (“As a reactive and critical posture, the old 
originalism thrived only in opposition.”). 
96
  Id. 
97
  Keith Whittington concludes that the old originalists were “primarily 
concerned with empowering popular majorities” (id. at 602), which also entailed 
upholding government power.  Id. at 602-03, n. 21. 
98
  See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 4, 18 (2d ed. 1997) 
(lamenting the Warren Court’s reading of “its libertarian convictions into the 
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misplaced, since originalist Justices have proven themselves at 
least as willing to strike down legislation as non-originalist 
Justices.99   
In its first iteration, originalism focused on the intentions of the 
Constitution’s framers or ratifiers, as the best source that 
interpreters ought to rely on if a constitutional provision is not 
clear.100  But two scholars effectively demolished the original 
intentions approach101 by demonstrating: first, the implausibility of 
reconstructing the original intentions of the framers;102 and second, 
the framers’ reluctance to have interpretations of the Constitution 
depend on claimed knowledge of their original intentions.103  
                                                                                                             
Fourteenth Amendment” and claiming that is has, through its reading of that 
Amendment exceeded its power by rewriting the Constitution); ROBERT BORK, 
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN 
DECLINE 109 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court has usurped the powers of 
the American people and their representatives and pursuit of left-wing policy-
making).   
99
  See KECK, MOST ACTIVIST COURT, at 40, Table 2.1 (2004) (indicating that, 
on an annual basis, between 1995 and 2003, the Rehnquist Court struck down 
far more federal statutes on constitutional grounds than did the supposedly 
activist Burger and Warren Courts); id. at 268 (stating that Justices Rehnquist, 
Thomas and Scalia all support judicial activism when they believe the original 
Constitution calls for it); Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of 
Amateur History, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT 
DYANMIC 70, 87 (Earl M. Maltz, ed. 2003) (noting that Justice Thomas 
“exhibits no tendency to defer to local or national legislators”). 
100
  Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 4. 
101
  See Colby & Smith, Originalism’s Living Constitutionalism, at 6 (stating 
that original intent theory met with “savage criticism” which exposed its two 
fundamental weaknesses); Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. 
REV. at  612 (describing the original intentions approach as having been 
“trounced” by its critics); id. at 613 (“If ever a theory had a stake driven through 
its heart, it seems to be originalism.”). 
102
  See Brest, The Misconceived Quest, 60 B.U. L. REV. at 222 (concluding that 
an “interpreter’s understanding of original understanding may be so 
indeterminate as to undermine the rationale for originalism” in the case of many 
controversial constitutional provisions”). 
103
  See Powell, Original Understanding, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 906-07 (pointing 
out the Federalists’ view that the intentions of the drafters of the Constitution 
would not be legally relevant because they were “mere scriveners” appointed to 
draft an instrument for the people). 
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Originalism, now called “new originalism” quickly overcame these 
objections by shifting from a focus on intention to a focus on the 
public meaning of the constitutional text as adopted – that is, on 
the meaning that the text would have for an ordinary 18th-century 
reader.104  This shift is especially significant for the purposes of 
this Article because Justice Scalia was one of the earliest advocates 
of the shift from subjective intention to textual meaning.105   
The new originalism has expanded beyond the reactive 
gestures of the old originalism.  It no longer seeks to hold the 
judiciary in check.106  Rather, it recognizes that originalism might 
require “the active exercise of the power of judicial review in order 
to keep faith with the principled commitments of the founding.”107  
Moreover, originalism is no longer tethered to a political agenda: it 
seeks not to criticize an overreaching court but to engage 
                                                 
104
  Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 609. 
105
  See Colby & Smith, Originalism’s Living Constitutionalism, at 6 (citing 
Scalia’s “campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to 
the Doctrine of Original Meaning”); Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. at 9 (“Justice Scalia was perhaps the first defender of originalism to shift 
the theory from its previous focus on the intentions of the framers of the 
Constitution to the original public meaning of the text at the time of its 
enactment.”); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Intepretive Conventions, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 519, 554-55 (2003), (crediting Justice Scalia with the suggestion, 
accepted by most originalists, to change the label of the doctrine from original 
intent to original meaning). 
106
  See, e.g., KECK, MOST ACTIVIST COURT, at 268 (indicating that the 
Rehnquist Court’s originalists were not averse to activism in support of their 
originalism);  Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, at 71 
(noting that Thomas “would overrule a remarkable number of cases, some 
dating back more than two hundred years, in the name of originalism.”); David 
R. Dow, et al., Judicial Activism on the Rehnquist Court: An Empirical 
Assessment, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEG. COMM. 35, 71 (2008) (providing a statistical 
breakdown of the Justices’ votes on an issue-by-issue basis and concluding that 
“Justice Scalia votes to thwart the majority in cases where the majoritarian view 
ought to rule”); Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s 
Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 73, 132 & n.408 (2007) (noting 
that the Court’s remedies jurisprudence supports the views of those who 
characterize the Rehnquist court as an activist court and citing numerous 
scholars who have so argued). 
107
  Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 609. 
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previously unexplored aspects of our constitutional history.108  
New originalism has also developed a body of normative theory to 
justify reliance on original meaning.109   
Still, the new originalism has much in common with the old 
originalism.  Like the old originalism, the new originalism 
“regards the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time 
of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional 
interpretation in the present.”110  New originalists concede some of 
the criticisms of original intent originalism, but claim that such 
criticisms are largely irrelevant to their own version of 
originalism.111  This claim is not entirely convincing for, as critics 
of the new originalism have pointed out, the sources that new 
originalists use to demonstrate original public meaning tend to be 
the same sources that old originalists used to demonstrate original 
intentions.112  At least some new originalists concede this point.113 
                                                 
108
  See id. at 608, (noting Randy Barnett’s research into the origins of the 
commerce clause, Barnett and Don Kates’ research on the origins of the Second 
Amendment, John Yoo’s originalist approach to war powers and Steven 
Calebresi and Christopher Yoo’s article on the historical origins of the concept 
of a unitary executive). 
109
  See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW  110-59 (1999) (developing 
a defense of originalism based on a version of popular sovereignty that he dubs 
“potential sovereignty”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Desirable Constitution and the Case for Originalism, Northwestern Public Law 
Research Paper No. 08-05, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1109247 
(last visited July 2, 2008) (providing a consequentialist defense of originalism); 
Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. at 629-43 (developing 
a defense of originalism based on principles that inform doctrines in contract 
law such as the statute of frauds and the parole evidence rule). 
110
  Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 599. 
111
  See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 94-95 (2004) (noting that early critics of originalism, 
such as Paul Brest and H. Jefferson Powell “left considerable room for 
originalism,” understood in this context as textualism rather than intentionalism, 
“to flourish”).  For an earlier iteration of the same arguments, see Barnett, 
Originalism for Non-Originalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. at 623-29 (reconciling the 
views of Brest and Powell with the new originalism). 
112
  See, e.g., SOTORIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 79, n.1 (2007) (“The distinction 
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More generally, scholars have begun to suggest that 
originalism can be reconciled with its theoretical nemesis,114 which 
has been variously characterized as living constitutionalism115 (my 
preferred term), non-originalism,116 pluralism,117 and 
developmental theory.118  In one sense, we are all originalists to the 
                                                                                                             
between intention and meaning is a refinement that cuts no ice with us.”); 
Telman, The Foreign Affairs Power, 80 TEMP. L. REV. at 261, n. 106 (noting 
that textualist and intentionalist approaches are not as divergent as they may 
appear, since practitioners of both approaches rely on the same sources of 
information to establish the meaning of the Constitution); Nelson, Originalism 
and Intepretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. at 556-58 (pointing out that 
original intent and original meaning most likely align in most cases and where 
they do not, modern readers are not well positioned to discern original 
meaning); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
353, 375, n. 130 (1981) (“[T]he difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the 
ratifiers leaves little choice but to accept the intent of the Framers as a fair 
reflection of it.”).   
113
  See Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 609-
610 (noting that the history of the constitutional drafting process can provide 
useful information about how the text was understood at the time and the 
significance of specific language that was included in or excluded from the 
document); Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. at 617 
(remarking that the distinction between textualism and originalism is hard to 
maintain). 
114
  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional 
Redemption, 24 CONST. COMM. 427, 428 (2007) (contending that living 
constitutionalists need not be and should not be non-originalists, since 
originalism means fidelity to the Constitution’s text and its principles); Jack M. 
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMM. 291, 292 (2007) 
(contending that the debate between originalism and living constitutionalism 
rests on a false dichotomy).  See also Colby & Smith, at 5 (arguing that 
originalists, in their internal debates, have produced their own version of living 
constitutionalism). 
115
  Balkin, Original Meaning, at 428 (identifying himself both an originalist 
and a living constitutionalist). 
116
  Id. (calling non-originalism a form of living constitutionalism), but see 
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 3 (“[T]he alternative to originalism is not 
‘nonoriginalism,” but rather traditional or conventional constitutional 
interpretation, which features a variety of forms, modes or methods.”).  But 
Griffin acknowledges that the division of scholars into originalism and 
nonoriginalism remains widespread.  Id. at 8-9 notes 41-45. 
117
  STEPHEN GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO 
POLITICS 143-52 (1996) 
118
  Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 4.   
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extent that we must at least in some circumstances care about what 
constitutional language meant at the time it was drafted rather than 
what it might mean to us now.  For example, the Guarantee 
Clause119 makes reference to “domestic Violence.”  As Jack Balkin 
points out, in the 18th century, that phrase meant “riots or 
disturbances within a state,” while today we associate the phrase 
with “assaults and batteries by intimates or by persons living 
within the same household.”120  It would be absurd to seek to 
change in our constitutional order simply because of change in 
linguistic usage.121  Similarly, living constitutionalists have not 
sought to impose a more modern meaning of the Constitution’s 
requirement that the President be 35 years of age, despite the fact 
that one could argue that the Framers simply intended that the 
President be a person of mature years.122  Indeed, there are no 
scholars who would argue that the original meaning of the 
Constitution is irrelevant to debates about its contemporary 
meaning.123   
                                                 
119
  U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. 
120
  Balkin, Original Meaning, at 430. 
121
  See id. at 429-32 (arguing for a form of originalism, compatible with living 
constitutionalism in which legal meaning is preserved). 
122
  U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.  See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 
CONST. COMM. at 305 (noting that his underlying principles approach to 
constitutional interpretation does not override the textual command when the 
text is “relatively rule-like, concrete and specific”). 
123
  See, e.g., YOO, POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, at 25 (noting that academics 
differ over how much deference to accord the Framers, not over whether or not 
they are due any deference at all); Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 10 
(“Scholars today distinguish among forms of originalism, not between 
originalism and nonoriginalism.”); Farber, The Originalism Debate, 49 OHIO ST. 
L. J. at1086 (“Almost no one believes that the original understanding is wholly 
irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation.”).  Eric Posner briefly 
posed as an exception to this general rule.  See Posner, “The Founders,” Opinio 
Juris Blog, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1187656698.shtml (Aug. 21, 2007) 
(last visited July 10, 2008) (“If academics on both sides of the issue could agree 
to debate the presidency, emergency powers, and the constitution without 
mentioning the framers, this alone would count as progress.”). But even Posner 
cannot resist reference to the framers as authority.  See Posner, “The President 
Versus the Presidency,” Opinio Juris Blog, 
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1187708614.shtml (Aug. 21, 2007) (last visited 
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Just as there are limits to living constitutionalism, most 
originalists also acknowledge limits to their own principles of 
constitutional interpretation.124  Living constitutionalists are not 
distinct from originalists because they pay no attention to the 
original meaning of the Constitution.  What separates living 
constitutionalists from originalists is the extent to which they are 
willing to incorporate interpretive materials other than literal 
original meaning into their understanding of what the Constitution 
demands of us today. 
B. Originalism and the Practice of the Medellín Court 
Neither the  nor the dissenting opinions in Medellín are 
originalist opinions.  As explained in Part IV, Chief Justice 
Roberts’ opinion is true neither to the original meaning of the 
Supremacy Clause nor to the early precedents, on which the 
opinion purports to rely, regarding the extent to which treaties 
must be given direct effect as binding U.S. law.  Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion takes the constitutional text and the early 
precedents more seriously, but he does so, appropriately enough, 
within the context of a broader appreciation of constitutional text, 
structure and history, as one would expect from a Justice 
committed to a version of living constitutionalism.  It is not 
inconsistent for a living constitutionalist to pay close attention to 
the original meaning of the constitutional text.125   
However, as originalism comes in many variations, perhaps we 
should not be too hasty in criticizing the originalist Justices for 
signing off on Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion.  Justice Scalia 
describes himself as a “faint-hearted originalist”126 and 
                                                                                                             
July 10, 2008) (commenting “oops!” on his own invocation of the founders as 
authority for his view of presidential power but invoking them nonetheless). 
124
  See, e.g., Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 864 (conceding that 
he would not uphold a statute calling for the punishment of flogging even if such 
a statute would have been permissible in 1789). 
125
  See Berman, Originalism is Bunk, at 22 (stating that non-originalism 
regards original meaning as relevant to judicial interpretation but that post- 
ratification facts can also bear on interpretation).  
126
  Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 864 (“I hasten to confess that 
in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist.”).  More recently, in 
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acknowledges that there are problems with originalist 
methodology.127  For example, Justice Scalia recognizes that the 
originalist enterprise really requires training in historical research, 
a task for which most judges are ill-prepared.128  Even a 
professional historian would need more time to undertake the 
originalist task properly than a judge typically has to decide a 
case.129   
In the end, however, Scalia defends his originalism based on 
his view that a “thing worth doing is worth doing badly.”130 Justice 
Scalia neglects to note the source of his motto.  It is from a chapter 
in Gilbert Chesterton’s 1910 book What’s Wrong with the World, 
in which Chesterton advocates separate and decidedly distinct 
education for women.131  One of Chesterton’s themes was the 
importance of maintaining the distinction between “specialists” 
and amateurs, or what he calls mankind’s “comrade-like aspect.”132  
He supported an educated amateurism, especially for women,133 
but his advice, quoted by Justice Scalia, was meant to guide people 
                                                                                                             
explaining that he would not undo all precedents associated with a non-
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, Scalia proclaimed, “I am a 
textualist. I am an originalist. I am not a nut.”  National Public Radio, 
Interviews: Scalia Defends a “Dead” Constitution, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526 (Apr. 28, 
2008) (last visited June 12, 2008) 
127
  See Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 856 (noting that 
originalism is “not without its warts”). 
128
  Id. at 856-57.  See also Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork’s Grand Inquisition, 
99 YALE L. J. 1419, 1420  (1999) (criticizing Bork’s originalism on the ground 
that his constitutional vision is “radically ahistorical”). 
129
  See id. at 860 (noting that it might take a longer time and more pages than 
are usually available to a judge to flesh out even a minor point “in a fasion that a 
serious historian would consider minimally adequate”). 
130
  Id. at 863. 
131
  GILBERT CHESTERTON, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE WORLD 314-320 (1910).  
The passage that Justice Scalia quotes appears on page 320, at the end of the 
chapter “Folly and Female Education.” 
132
  See id. at 130-31 (citing as “the peculiar period of our time” the “eclipse of 
comradeship and equality by specialism and domination”). 
133
  See id. at 319-20 (describing the product of his preferred, old-fashioned 
education as “maintaining the bold equilibrium of inferiorities which is the most 
mysterious of superiorities and perhaps the most unattainable”). 
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in their pursuit of hobbies, not in their professional lives. As one 
Chesterton authority put it, Chesterton’s advice was intended to 
apply to activities such as writing one’s own love letters and 
blowing one’s own nose.134  More generally, Chesterton urged 
people to engage in all sorts of amateurism, as he believed that an 
energetic engagement in hobbies and leisure activities were the 
crucial to human being.  However, he did not refuse to recognize 
any social role for the specialist whatsoever.  He did not advocate 
amateurism when it came to playing the organ or serving as Royal 
Astronomer.135  In short, Justice Scalia’s motto does not inspire 
confidence when applied to a brain surgeon, a mechanical engineer 
or a federal judge.  If one cannot have any confidence that judges 
can do a good job of discerning original meaning, there is no 
reason to base constitutional interpretation on that hopeless 
endeavor. 
Moreover, Justice Scalia acknowledges that there really is 
much less difference between his “faint-hearted” originalism and 
non-originalism.136  This is indeed a theme on which critics of 
originalism have picked up.137  But it is not clear where this leaves 
Scalia’s originalism.  He insists that he remains an originalist.138  
                                                 
134
  Quotemeister, The American Chesterton Society, available at 
http://chesterton.org/qmeister2/doingbadly.htm (last visited August 7, 2008).   
135
  See id. (“There are things like playing the organ or discovering the North 
Pole, or being Astronomer Royal, which we do not want a person to do at all 
unless he does them well.”). 
136
  See Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 862 (acknowledging that 
“there is really no difference between the faint-hearted originalist and the 
moderate nonoriginalist” and that “most originalists are faint-hearted and most 
nonoriginalists are moderate.”).   
137
 Paul Brest, one of the earliest and most effective critics of originalism, 
echoes Justice Scalia: 
The only difference between moderate originalism and 
nonoriginalist adjudication is one of attitude toward the text 
and original understanding.  For the moderate originalist, these 
sources are conclusive when they speak clearly.  For the 
nonoriginalists, they are important but not determinative. 
Brest, The Misconceived Quest, 60 B.U. L. REV. at 229.  
138
  See National Public Radio, Interviews: Scalia Defends a “Dead” 
Constitution, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526 
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Yet some originalists maintain that he is not.139  He certainly 
invokes originalism when criticizing his fellow Justices’ handling 
of a particular case, but in Medellín, he blithely signed off on an 
opinion that was not merely non-originalist but anti-originalist – 
that is, an opinion willfully blind to the meaning of the Supremacy 
Clause.   
Justice Scalia’s “faint-hearted” version of originalism might 
permit of the type of reasoning followed by the Medellín dissent, 
but because the Majority opinion ignores the strong originalist 
arguments of the dissenting Justices, it is hard to see the Majority 
opinion as anything other than a renunciation of originalism as an 
approach to the Supremacy Clause.  David Schulz and Christopher 
Smith argue that, despite Scalia’s professed originalism, 
“ideological factors influence how Scalia reads what the framers 
meant or what he claims the framers meant.”140  This would seem 
to be the case in Medellín, as the Majority opinion cannot be 
reconciled with even a faint-hearted version of originalism. 
In any case, the Majority opinion cannot be reconciled with the 
stricter originalism espoused by Justice Thomas.141 However, a 
review of Justice Thomas’s voting record suggests that he is less a 
consistent originalist than he is a consistent conservative.142  The 
foremost commentator on Justice Thomas’s version of originalism 
contends that Thomas alternates between two versions of 
originalism (which yield different results) depending on the nature 
                                                                                                             
(Apr. 28, 2008) (last visited June 12, 2008) (quoting Scalia describing himself as 
an originalist and a textualist). 
139
  Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. at 13 (concluding that Justice 
Scalia is not an originalist) 
140
  DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL 
VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 41 (1996).   
141
  See Christopher E. Smith & Cheryl D. Lema, Justice Clarence Thomas and 
Incommunicado Detention: Justifications and Risks: 39 VAL. L. REV. 783, 792 
(2005) (“More so than any other contemporary justice, Thomas consistently 
advocates the strict application of key tools for interpreting the constitution: its 
text and history.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).  
142
  See id. at 784 (characterizing Thomas as the most conservative sitting 
Justice). 
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of the case.143  It is not at all unusual for the Court’s originalists to 
let their political commitments trump those of originalism.144  
Indeed, the Court’s self-proclaimed originalists are among the 
most consistently conservative Supreme Court Justices over the 
past 70 years.145   
And so, Medellín is best understood as a political decision 
rather than one grounded in either the original meaning of the 
Supremacy Clause or even in the meaning of that Clause as 
reflected in subsequent legal precedent.  Indeed, it seems a 
decision that simply accords with the Majority’s skeptical views 
regarding the extent to which the United States should be bound by 
its international commitments.   
IV.  MEDELLÍN AND THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE 
Gordon Wood, recognized as “one of the leading historians of 
the early republic,”146 suggests that “most of the means by which 
                                                 
143
  See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
CLARENCE THOMAS 193 (1999) (summarizing Thomas’s jurisprudence as liberal 
originalism with respect civil rights and conservative originalism on civil 
liberties and federalism). 
144
  See, e.g., Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, at 71 
(noting that Thomas always sides with conservative historians whenever there is 
a disagreement among historians and that he jettisons originalism entirely when 
doing so serves conservative interests). 
145
  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: 
A Statistical Study, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126403 (April 2008) (last 
visited July 13, 2008), manuscript at 46 (ranking Justice Thomas first and Scalia 
third among 43 Justices on the Court from 1937-2006 in terms of their tendency 
to vote with the more conservative justices in non-unanimous cases); see also 
SCHULTZ & SMITH, JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION, at xvi (labeling Scalia a 
“consistent conservative” based on empirical studies of his voting behavior 
while also noting a handful of cases in which Scalia surprised observers by 
siding with the more liberal Justices). 
146
  Griffin, Originalism Rebooted, at 26.  See also Saikrishna B. Prakash & 
John C. Yoo, Questions for the Critics of Judicial Review, 72 GEORGE WASH. L. 
REV. 354, 365 (2003) (heralding Wood as one of two leading intellectual 
historians of the early national period); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional 
32 NAME OF JOURNAL 2008 
we carry on our governmental business” such as the cabinet, 
administrative agencies, the political parties and judicial review, 
are “unmentioned in the Constitution and are the products of 
historical experience.”147  One would thus expect originalism to 
apply, if at all, only in the limited contexts in which the 
constitutional text in some way establishes or at least delimits the 
boundaries of our political institutions.  From this perspective, 
originalism may make less (or even less) sense in the realm of 
treaty law than it does in other realms of constitutional law.   
Very few aspects of the constitutional design with respect to 
treaties have been realized in our practice.  For example, although 
the Constitution provides that the President may make a treaty “by 
and with” the Senate’s “advice and consent,”148 the Senate has not 
fulfilled its advisory capacity since the time of President 
Washington.149  More strikingly still, although the Constitution 
provides only one mechanism, the Treaty Clause, through which 
the United States may enter into international agreements, the 
political branches frequently bypass the rather onerous Article II 
                                                                                                             
Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1646-47 (2002) (listing Wood’s Creation of the 
American Republic among the leading secondary works on the framing period); 
Flaherty, History Right?, 99 COLUM. L. REV. at 2103, n. 38 (reporting the results 
of an unscientific “poll” that found Wood to be the historian most cited in law 
reviews). 
147
  Gordon S. Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS, 33, 39-40 (Feb. 18, 1988).  See also Keith E. Whittington, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
MEANING 12 (1999) (listing 87 examples of “constitutional constructions,” that 
is processes whereby our constitutional systems evolves, develops or takes 
practical effect through governing structures and policies without formal 
amendment judicial constitutional interpretation). 
148
  U.S. Const., art. II, §2, ¶ 2. 
149
  See Telman, The Foreign Affairs Power, 80 TEMP. L. REV. at 282 (noting 
that President Washington originally thought that the Senate had constitutional 
power to advise the President on treaty negotiation); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin 
S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 545, 631, 634 (2004) (noting that the Framers as well as both the Senate 
and the President during Washington first administration understood the  
Constitution to provide the Senate with advisory power before treaties were 
finalized). 
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requirements of advise and consent by two-thirds of the Senate,150 
choosing instead to commit the United States to international 
agreements through executive-legislative agreements or through 
sole executive agreements.151  Indeed, in recent decades, nearly 
90% of the United States’ international obligations arise through 
mechanisms other than Article II treaties.152  Oona Hathaway has 
recently suggested that the United States jettison treaties entirely 
(or nearly entirely) in favor of the extra-constitutional alternatives, 
as there is no principled reason for why our government enters into 
international obligations through one method or the other and 
congressional-executive agreements are more likely to be adhered 
to.153   
Nonetheless, as the dissenting Justices suggest, the 
Constitution does provide guidance on the extent to which treaties 
are supreme law, enforceable in domestic courts.  Chief Justice 
Roberts’ opinion proceeds as if the Constitution were silent on this 
issue, but as the concluding section of this Part will show, the 
original meaning of the Supremacy Clause strongly favors a 
presumption in favor of according treaties the status of supreme, 
self-executing federal law.  The Majority’s decision to ignore 
original meaning in this instance and to favor state law over the 
international obligations of the United States raises unnecessary 
barriers to the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches 
of the federal government. 
                                                 
150
  U.S. const. Art. II, § 2 ¶ 2. 
151
  Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of 
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1238 (2008) 
(noting that the United States makes binding international agreements through 
two separate processes, one of which is laid out in the Constitution and one that 
is not). 
152
  Id. at 1258, 1260 (listing by category 375 treaties and 2744 congressional-
executive agreements entered into by the United States between 1980 and 2000). 
153
  Id. at 1241 (stating that “nearly everything that is done through the Treaty 
Clause can and should be done through congressional-executive agreements”). 
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A. The Sources of Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion in Medellín 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in the Medellín case has been 
widely praised as “careful” and “modest.”154  It is neither.  Because 
the Court could easily have found that the trial court’s decision 
dismissing Medellín’s habeas petition on the merits155 complied 
with the “review and reconsideration” called for in the Avena 
decision,156 the petition for certiorari was inprovidently granted.  
The Medellín opinion was thus offered in violation of the “last 
resort rule,” according to which “a federal court should refuse to 
rule on a constitutional issue if the case can be resolved on a 
nonconstitutional basis.”157   
                                                 
154
  See, e.g., Kent Scheidegger, Medellín Discussion Board: The Ball Is in 
Congress’s Court, SCOTUSBlog (Mar. 27, 2008), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/medellin-discussion-board-the-ball-is-in-
congresss-court/#more-6908, last visited May 27, 2008 (finding the holding in 
Medellín “not all that remarkable.”); Richard Samp, Medellín Discussion Board: 
The Court Defers to Congress, SCOTUSBlog (Mar. 25,2008), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/medellin-discussion-board-the-court-defers-to-
congress/, last visited May 27, 2008 (discerning a show of humility in the 
Majority’s expressed willingness to defer to Congress if it were to pass 
legislation calling for the implementation of Avena); Paul Stephan, Medellín v. 
Texas: “Modest and Fairly Careful,” Opinio Juris Blog (Mar. 25, 2008) 
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1206470637.shtml, last visited May 27, 2008 
(tentatively concluding that “Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court is 
modest and fairly careful”); Julian Ku, Medellín: My Early Thoughts, Opinio 
Juris Blog (Mar. 25, 2008), http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1206464651.shtml, 
last visited May 27, 2008 (calling the Majority opinion “fairly sensible and 
reasonable”). 
155
  See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1355, n.1 (noting the trial court’s finding that 
Medellín had not been prejudiced by the United States’ failure to grant him his 
consular consultation rights under the VCCR because the VCCR only requires 
notice of such rights within three days of arrest and Medellín had confessed 
within three hours).   
156
  2004 ICJ Rep. at 72. 
157
  Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 
1003, 1004 (1994).  Chief Justice Roberts himself recently invoked the doctrine, 
calling it a “fundamental rule of judicial restraint” and noting that “[o]ur 
precedents have long counseled us to avoid deciding . . . hypothetical questions 
of constitutional law” unless such questions are unavoidable.  Boumediene v. 
Bush, 128 S.Ct. at 2281-82 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).   
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In its brief for the Court, the State of Texas urged the Court to 
dismiss the case on the basis that the trial court’s finding that 
Medellín had not been prejudiced satisfied the ICJ’s requirement 
of review and reconsideration.158  During oral argument, Justice 
Kennedy voiced some sympathy for Texas’s position on this 
matter.159  Athough the ruling of the Texas court is patently absurd, 
if the Court agreed that Texas had already granted the necessary 
review and reconsideration, it should have ruled on that sub-
constitutional basis.  If it disagreed, the Court should have taken 
the opportunity to point out that while a criminal defendant who 
confesses to the police is unlikely to be acquitted, that confession 
in no way precludes a well-counseled defendant from presenting 
mitigating evidence that would make the imposition of the death 
penalty unlikely.  Thus, for example, the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals recognized that Osbaldo Torres, another 
Mexican national whose interests were at issue in the Avena case, 
suffered prejudice with respect to his capital sentence even though 
he was not prejudiced with regard to his conviction for first-degree 
murder.160   
The substantive portion161 of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion 
begins by acknowledging that Medellín relies on the Supremacy 
Clause.162  Without any discussion of the founding documents 
pertaining to the Supremacy Clause or of any of the historical 
                                                 
158
  Brief for Respondent, at 49-50, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) 
(No. 06-984), 2007 WL 2428387.   
159
  See Transcript of Oral Argument, at 20, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 
(2008) (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 2945736 (“And I have a problem, incidentally, 
because I think Medellin did receive all the hearing that he's entitled to under the 
judgment anyway.”).   
160
  Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184, 1189 (Okla. Crim 2005).  See John F. 
Murphy, Medellín v. Texas: Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision for 
the United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, 31 SUFF. 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 247, 260-61 (detailing the commutation of Torres’ death 
sentence by Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry and Torres’ unsuccessful attempt 
to gain further relief from the courts). 
161
  Part I of the opinion introduces the relevant treaty law and recites the facts 
and procedural history of the case.  Medellín, 128 S.Ct at 1353-56.  Only in Part 
II does Justice Roberts begin to set out the applicable substantive U.S. law. 
162
  Id. at 1356 
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scholarship discussing the original meaning and purpose of the 
Supremacy Clause, the Chief Justice proceeds directly to a 
discussion of the distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties.163  It is hard to see what is “careful” about an 
opinion that interprets a constitutional provision, the Supremacy 
Clause, without more that a meager reference to it, its legislative 
history, or the substantial body of scholarship pertaining to its 
original meaning.  In fact, Chief Justice Roberts’ Medellín opinion 
ignores the plain meaning of the constitutional text, relies on a few 
Supreme Court cases while ignoring others, 164 as well as dozens of 
other federal cases that suggest a presumption in favor of self-
execution, and then mis-applies the few cases on which he 
purportedly relies.   
The doctrine of self-execution is not of constitutional origin.165  
Rather it is an invention of the Marshall Court.166  The authority 
cited in the Majority opinion for the doctrine of self-execution 
consists of several cases,167 one of which cites to one passage from 
The Federalist Papers,168 and the Restatement (3d) of U.S. Foreign 
                                                 
163
  Id. 
164
  See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1392-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing an 
appendix listing Supreme Court cases, most of which are not cited by the 
Majority, in which treaties were held to be self-executing). 
165
  Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM J. INT’L L. 760, 760 (1988) 
(arguing that the distinction created in caselaw between self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties “is patently inconsistent with the express language” of the 
Supremacy Clause); Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J. at 1233 
(characterizing the idea of non-self-executing treaties as “judicially created”).  
According to Paust, the phrase “self-executing” did not appear in a U.S. 
Supreme Court opinion until 1887 in Bartram v. Robertson.  Paust, Self-
Executing Treaties, 82 AM J. INT’L L. at 766. 
166
  See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. at 700 (“The distinction 
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties was introduced into U.S. 
jurisprudence by the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson.”). 
167
  See Medellín, at 1356-57 (citing, in order of citation: Foster v. Neilson, 2 
Pet. 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 
51 (1833); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Igartúa-De La Rosa v. 
United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); and the Head Money 
Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).   
168
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1357.  The appeal to the authority of The Federalist 
Papers is only for Hamilton’s rather ambiguous comparison between laws that 
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Relations Law.169  In explaining its views on the doctrine, the 
Majority notes, in a manner that is neither enlightening nor tending 
to inspire confidence in the strength of the precedent on which the 
Court purports to be relying, that various courts have understood 
the doctrine of self execution differently.170  The Majority explains 
that it understands “self-execution” to mean that a “treaty has 
                                                                                                             
individuals are “bound to observe” as “the supreme law of the land” and a “mere 
treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties.”  Id., citing THE FEDERALIST 
No. 33, 207 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961).  Since Federalist No. 33 deals with the 
taxing power and the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is unclear 
that it has any relevance to the doctrine of self-execution at all.  In context, it 
seems that Hamilton’s true purpose is to contrast a law with a mere pact between 
private parties. 
169
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1357, n. 3, citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1986) 
170
  See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356, n.2 (“The label ‘self-executing’ has on 
occasion been used to convey different meanings.”).  A more interesting 
discussion of federal courts’ problematic handling of what it means to call a 
treaty self-execution or non-self-executing can be found in the scholarly 
literature.  As the dissent notes (128 S.Ct. at 1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting), at 
least one scholar has argued that the doctrine of self-execution is not the best 
way to explain case law on the judicial enforcement of treaties.  See Tim Wu, 
Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 573-74 (2007) (arguing that the best 
guide to whether a court will enforce a treaty is the identity of the entity alleged 
to have violated the treaty and concluding that courts are most likely to enforce 
treaties violated by state governments and more likely to defer to decisions of 
the political branches of the federal government to violate a treaty).  See also 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause 
and Presumption of Self-Execution,  forthcoming in 121 HARV. L. REV. (2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1118063 (last 
visited July 14, 2008), manuscript at 3, n. 8 (noting that “self-executing” can 
mean that a treaty is “addressed to” the legislature, although it could also mean 
“addressed to” the executive, and in that case the Presidents Memorandum (see 
supra, note 4) is adequate execution);  Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. 
INT’L L. at 696-97 (identifying four distinct grounds on which a court might 
conclude that legislative action is necessary before it can enforce a treaty);  
Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM J. INT’L L. at 775-81 (criticizing courts for 
straying from the original meaning and from Justice Marshall’s method of treaty 
interpretation in positing that some treaties must be non-self-executing if their 
implementation requires an exercise of congressional power); Yuji Iwasawa, 
The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 
627, 635-42 (1986) (summarizing differing positions staked out by courts and in 
legal scholarship on the possible meanings of the doctrine of self execution). 
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automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification,”171 but 
it does not ground its understanding of the doctrine in precedent, 
history or logic.  Instead, relying on a handful of cases decided 
over a nearly 175-year span, the Court concludes that a treaty is 
only self-executing – that is, that a treaty has domestic effect as 
federal law upon ratification – only if it “contains stipulations 
which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make 
them operative.”172  The Court thus subtly changes the rule laid 
down by Justice Marshall which, consistent with the Supremacy 
Clause, provided that treaties are presumed to be self-executing 
unless the parties to the treaty stipulate otherwise173 into a 
presumption against self-execution absent a contrary provision. 
Having established the status of treaties as domestic law 
without any analysis of the Supremacy Clause, the Chief Justice 
then proceeds to a discussion of the treaties at issue.  The Optional 
Protocol, he concludes, is a “bare grant of jurisdiction” which 
“does not itself commit signatories to comply with an ICJ 
judgment.”174  The key language of the U.N. Charter provides that 
each Member “undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] 
in any case to which it is a party.”175  Chief Justice Roberts reasons 
that this provision cannot be self-executing because the “sole 
                                                 
171
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356, n.2. 
172
  Id. at 1357, citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. at 194.  Justice Breyer 
points out in dissent that it is absurd to expect a multilateral treaty to address the 
issue of self-execution, as some states automatically incorporate treaties into 
domestic law.  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1381, 1383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See 
also Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 709 (“Perhaps because of 
the diversity of domestic-law rules on the subject, nations negotiating treaties 
rarely address matters of domestic implementation.”); Paust, Self-Executing 
Treaties, 82 AM J. INT’L L. at 771 (criticizing Justice Marshall’s approach to the 
question of the domestic effect of treaties given that parties to a treaty “rarely 
concern themselves with the details of domestic implementation”); Iwasawa, 
Self-Executing Treaties, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 627at 654 (noting that parties 
negotiating a treaty rarely concern themselves with the treaty’s domestic validity 
and thus it is “very rare” to find a treaty that indicates whether a treaty – 
especially a multilateral treaty – is to be self-executing). 
173
  See United States v. Perchemen, 7 Pet. at 88-89 (finding a treaty self-
executing where it does not stipulate to the need for some future legislative act). 
174
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1358.  
175
  U.N. CHARTER, Art. 94(1). 
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remedy for noncompliance”176 provided by the Charter is “referral 
to the United Nations Security Council by an aggrieved state.”177  
The Chief Justice also finds some support for this reading of the 
U.N. Charter in the Senate hearings on the ratification of the 
Charter, and he treats that evidence as decisive.178  Reliance on 
                                                 
176
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1359 (emphasis added). 
177
  Id., quoting U.N.CHARTER, Art. 94(2).  Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, 
makes the obvious point that there is nothing in the language of the Charter to 
suggest that the political remedy is the sole remedy.  Id. at 1383-85 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).   On the contrary, the political remedy is an extraordinary remedy, 
since it was the expectation of the framers of the Charter that states would 
comply with ICJ decisions, and that expectation has been largely realized.  See 
Jordan J. Paust, Medellín, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant 
Executive Authority, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 299, 301-02, n.7 (2008) 
(describing Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter as creating an additional 
enforcement option, which has never been used and which in any case does not 
render an ICJ judgment any less binding); Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of 
Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 378 (2008) (“[W]hile Article 94(2) also 
provides for possible referral to the Security Council in the event of 
noncompliance, this scarcely detracts from the international legal obligation to 
comply.”). 
178
  The Majority opinion first cites to a statement made in the hearings of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to the effect that “if a state fails to 
perform its obligations under a judgment of the [ICJ], the other party may have 
recourse to the Security Council.”  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1359, citing Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 124-25 (1945) (emphasis 
added).  The phrase “may have recourse” hardly suggests an exclusive remedy.  
The Majority opinion then cites to statements of Leo Paslovsky, Special 
Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organizations and Security 
Affairs, and Charles Fahy, Legal Advisor to the State Department.  Medellín, 
128 S.Ct. at 1359.  Paslovsky recognizes that a state’s refusal to implement a 
decision of the ICJ creates a political rather than a legal dispute.  Such a 
statement is not in the least surprising, since the Security Council is a political 
body.  Paslovsky said nothing about the exclusivity of the remedy.  Fahy stated 
only that parties accepting ICJ jurisdiction have a moral obligation to comply 
with ICJ decisions and that Article 94(2) provides the exclusive means of 
enforcement of such decisions.  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1359-60.  There is no 
disputing the accuracy of Fahy’s statement as a matter of international law.  It is 
very difficult to see why it is relevant to the question of whether ICJ decisions 
are enforceable as domestic law.  As Justice Breyer points out, one would not 
expect the U.N. Charter, or any international agreement, to specify the status of 
its provisions as a matter of domestic law.  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1381 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).     
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such unilateral statements is not called for under the Supreme 
Court precedents on which Chief Justice Roberts relies, Foster v. 
Neilson and Perchemen, as those cases seem to stand for the 
principle that treaties are to be considered self-executing unless the 
parties to the treaties intend otherwise.179 
There is more than a little irony in Chief Justice Roberts’ 
argument that the U.N. Charter cannot be treated as self-executing 
absent clearer language in the treaty or the legislative history 
behind its ratification.  Foreign relations, the Chief Justice reminds 
us, is committed by the Constitution to the political departments.180  
If we were to treat the Charter as self-executing, that “would 
eliminate the option of non-compliance contemplated by Article 
94(2), undermining the ability of the political branches to 
determine whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment.”181  
But in this case, the President has determined how to comply with 
the ICJ judgment.  He directed state courts to implement the Avena 
decision.182  The other political branch was silent.  The effect of 
the Majority opinion is to prevent the Executive branch from 
conducting foreign policy (even where it faces no political 
opposition) by complying with an international court’s decision 
and to entrust control over U.S. foreign relations to the courts of 
the State of Texas.  As we shall see in Part IV. B., infra, this is 
pretty much exactly the result the Framers sought to avoid through 
the Supremacy Clause. 
Chief Justice Roberts proceeds to defend his interpretive 
approach as rooted in two cases from the early Republic, Foster 
and Percheman.183  The dissent characterizes that approach as 
“look[ing] for the wrong thing (explicit textual expression about 
self-execution) using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong 
                                                 
179
  See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 706-08 (arguing that 
permitting the U.S. to determine unilaterally whether a treaty is self-executing is 
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause as interpreted in Foster and 
Perchemen). 
180
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1360. 
181
  Id. 
182
  See President’s Memorandum, supra note 4. 
183
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1362.   
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place (the treaty language).”184  The Chief Justice accepts this 
characterization,185 but says little in its defense beyond the paltry 
citations to authority already indicated.  Nor does the Majority 
respond to the dissent’s arguments that courts have routinely found 
treaties to be self-executing despite the lack of a clear statement 
that no further legislative action was required.186 Indeed, as Justice 
Stevens’ concurring opinion can only name one ratified and one 
un-ratified treaty that would pass the Majority’s clear statement 
rule187 it is obvious that the Majority’s clear statement standard has 
never been the operative test for self-execution under U.S. law.188  
The Majority opinion nevertheless rejects the dissent’s far more 
traditional approach to the issue of self-execution on the ground 
that it is “arrestingly indeterminate.”189   
This is a baffling verdict.  The Majority opinion is completely 
untethered to any constitutional authority; it meanders across two 
centuries of legal opinions and plucks out a handful of cases that 
do not even support its interpretive approach, and then it briefly 
visits the relevant treaty texts190 before rifling through the relevant 
                                                 
184
  Id. at 1389 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
185
  See id. at 1362 (“[W]e have to confess that we do think it rather important 
to look to the treaty language to see what it has to say about the issue.”). 
186
  Id. at 1380-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
187
  Id. at 1373 and n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).   
188
  Id. at 1381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
189
  Id. at 1362. 
190
  The Majority’s approach to treaty interpretation, which pays no attention to 
the object and purpose of the treaty or to its drafting history, is inconsistent with 
both international and domestic law.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1968), 
Art. 31(1); Air France v. Saks, 105 S.Ct. 1338 (1985).  The Majority cites to Air 
France for the principle that “the interpretation of a treaty . . . begins with its 
text” and also notes cases in which the Court has also considered “the 
negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as the ‘postratification 
understanding’ of signatory nations.”  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1357.  However, 
the Majority includes only the most limited discussion of the negotiation and 
drafting history of the relevant treaties and limits its inquiry into the 
“postratification understanding” of those treaties to that of the United States.  
Indeed, Jordan Paust suggests that the Majority ignores evidence that the VCCR 
is self-executing.  Paust, Medellín, Avena, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. at 304, 
n. 15 (citing numerous authorities in support of the claim that the United States 
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ratification history to pluck out a few perhaps helpful quotations.  
How this approach is any more determinate than the dissent’s 
traditional deference to the Supremacy Clause is hard to fathom.  
Indeed, the decision calls the enforceability of innumerable treaties 
into doubt, as evidenced by a decision of the American Bar 
Association and the American Society of International Law to 
form a joint task force to evaluate the efficacy of U.S. treaties as a 
matter of domestic law in the aftermath of Medellín.191  Justice 
Breyer is simply correct to point out that the Majority opinion 
“erects legal hurdles that can threaten the application of provisions 
in many existing commercial and other treaties and make it more 
difficult to negotiate new ones.”192 
B. The Supremacy Clause and the Doctrine of Self-Execution 
Justice Breyer, writing in dissent in Medellín, identifies the 
issue in that case as whether or not “an ICJ judgment rendered 
pursuant to the parties’ consent to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction . . . 
automatically become[s] part of domestic law.”193  Unlike the 
Majority, Justice Breyer concludes that the issue cannot be 
answered by looking to the language of the treaties at issue.  
Rather, the issue must be resolved as a matter of domestic law, 
with reference to early cases, decided by “Justices well aware of 
the Founders’ original intent” in adopting the Supremacy 
Clause.194  Based on a very abbreviated discussion of those cases, 
guided by the relevant scholarship,195 Justice Breyer concludes that 
the ICJ’s Avena judgment “is enforceable as a matter of domestic 
law without further legislation.”196  That conclusion is of less 
significance to us than is the scholarship on the original meaning 
                                                                                                             
considers the VCCR self-executing and supreme federal law).  See also, 
Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 116 F.3d at 622 (Butzner, J., concurring) (stating 
that the VCCR is self-executing). 
191
  E-mail from Elizabeth Anderson, Executive Director of the American 
Society of International Law (July 2, 2008) (listing members of the Task Force) 
(on file with author). 
192
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1381-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
193
  Id. at 1377. 
194
  Id. 
195
  Id. at 1377-80. 
196
  Id. at 1377. 
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of the Supremacy Clause that Justice Breyer summarizes and the 
Chief Justice ignores.  What follows is an expanded summary of 
the scholarship invoked by the dissenting Justices, supplemented 
with additional scholarship not referenced in the Medellín 
opinions.  It is striking that none of this background, relevant to the 
original meaning of the Supremacy Clause, informs the Majority 
opinion.   Indeed, even the dissent provides only a hint of the vast 
evidence suggesting that the original intent and meaning of the 
Supremacy Clause was to create a presumption in favor of self-
execution. 
The purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to prevent U.S. 
treaty violations “by empowering the courts to enforce treaties at 
the behest of affected individuals without awaiting authorization 
from state or federal legislatures.”197 This presumption of self-
execution, though limited,198 was in marked contrast, in the 
Framers’ view, to the laws of England199 and in the American 
colonies under the Articles of Confederation.200  Indeed, the 
Supremacy Clause embodied the Framers’ response to the more 
                                                 
197
  Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 696. 
198
  See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 696-97 (identifying four 
grounds on which a court might conclude legitimately that a treaty required 
legislative action for enforcement). 
199
  See id. at 697 & n. 12 (stating that under the fundamental law of Great 
Britain, treaties were non-self-executing except that admiralty and prize courts 
were empowered to give direct effect to the laws of nations, including treaties).  
See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 254 (1829) (contrasting the general rule 
of international law regarding treaties, whereby they are not automatically 
domestic law with the “different principle” announced under the Supremacy 
Clause); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 276 (1796) (opinion of J. Iredell) (calling 
the British practice of requiring legislative effectuation of treaty provisions 
“constantly observed”).   Martin Flaherty points out that the Framers may have 
been incorrect in their assumption that treaties were presumptively non-self-
executing under the laws of England.  Flaherty, History Right, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. at 2112. 
200
  See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 698 (noting the 
“widespread understanding” that treaties concluded by the Continental Congress 
were not enforceable in state courts in the face of conflicting legislation and the 
federal government’s lack of a mechanism for making state courts enforce 
treaties). 
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general problem of enforcing federal law.201  The Framers adopted 
the more radical language of the New Jersey plan, declaring 
treaties to be “the supreme Law of the Land,” rather than giving 
Congress the power to “negative” state legislation as proposed in 
the rival Virginia Plan, thus incorporating U.S. treaties into 
domestic law with no requirement for congressional 
implementation.202   
As Justice Breyer notes,203 James Madison explained that the 
Supremacy Clause was necessary to prevent the federal 
government from being embarrassed by state regulation that 
substantially frustrated the government’s ability to comply with 
treaty obligations, as had occurred under the Articles of 
Confederation.204  Numerous statements by other significant 
Framers support this view of the purpose and meaning of the 
Supremacy Clause.  As early as 1786, John Jay advocated for a 
rule prohibiting the legislatures of the several states from passing 
any act that could in any way restrain, limit or counteract the 
operation or execution of a treaty.205 James Iredell, a member of 
the North Carolina ratifying convention206 and thus precisely the 
sort of person in whose views a textualist originalist ought to take 
an interest,207 similarly viewed a treaty as “law of the land,” 
                                                 
201
  See id. (calling this problem the “principal reason for the Framers’ decision 
to draft a new constitution rather than amend the Articles” of Confederation.). 
202
  Id. at 698-99. 
203
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1378 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
204
  THE FEDERALIST, No. 42, 264 (C. Rossiter, ed., 1961) (J. Madison).  See 
also Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. at 277 (opinion of J. Irdedell) (noting that the 
Supremacy Clause was passed to prevent states from ignoring treaty obligations, 
a “difficulty which every one knows had been the means of greatly distressing 
the union, and injuring its public credit”). 
205
  Jay, report to congress, Oct. 13, 1786, quoted in  1 CHARLES HENRY 
BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 268, 274, n. 4 
(1902).  See also Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. at 760-61 
(remarking that Congress unanimously adopted Jay’s report, reflecting the 
expectation that treaties would be supreme law, and that Jay made similar 
remarks after becoming Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court). 
206
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1378. 
207
  See YOO, POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, at 27-28 (arguing that the views of 
the ratifiers of the Constitution are the most important, since the ratifiers bound 
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binding upon the people.208  In South Carolina, both John Rutledge 
and Charles Pinckney stated their views that treaties were 
“paramount” laws.209  Not surprisingly, these views are consistent 
with the express language of the Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause,210 which declares treaties supreme federal law, operative 
notwithstanding any contrary state law.   
Early Supreme Court decisions are also consistent with the 
express language of the Supremacy Clause.211  In Ware v. 
Hylton,212 for example, a British creditor sought payment of an 
American’s Revolutionary War debt pursuant to the 1783 Paris 
Peace Treaty.213  The debtor claimed that he had paid the debt by 
paying the money owed into a Virginia state fund in accordance 
with Virginia law.214  Each Justice wrote separately in the case, but 
all agreed that the Virginia statute was invalid.215  In his Medellín 
dissent, Justice Breyer appropriately focused on the opinion of 
Justice Iredell,216 which distinguished between portions of the 
treaty that had been “executed” and those which were 
“executory.”217  Justice Iredell defined “executed” as treaty 
provisions that “from the nature of them . . . require no further act 
to be done.”218  Executory provisions are addressed to a branch of 
the federal government because “when a nation promises to d o a 
                                                                                                             
the people they represented through their votes and therefore their understanding 
of the document is the most relevant original meaning). 
208
  See Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. at 761 and n. 9 
(noting that Iredell, like Jay, made similar comments after becoming a Justice of 
the U.S. Supreme Court). 
209
  Id. at 763.   
210
  U.S. Const. art. VI, ¶ 2. 
211
  See Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. at 765 and n. 36 
(listing ten cases decided between 1796 and 1825 in which “treaty law was 
accepted as operating as supreme federal law in the face of inconsistent state 
law”).  
212
  3 Dall. 199 (1796). 
213
  Id. at 203-04. 
214
  Id. at 220-21 (opinion of Chase, J). 
215
  Id. at 285. 
216
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1378 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
217
  Ware, 3 Dall. at 272. 
218
  Id. 
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thing, it is to be understood that this promise is to be carried into 
execution, in the manner which the Constitution of that nation 
prescribes.”219  Iredell thus suggests that treaties that “prescribe 
laws to the people for their obedience” must be implemented 
through legislative action.220  But Iredell then goes on to explain 
that after the passage of the Constitution, if a treaty is 
constitutional, “it is also by the vigor of its own authority to be 
executed in fact.” 221 In short, Iredell rejects the notion that after 
the Supremacy Clause there can be any talk of non-self-executing 
treaty provisions.222 
In its first case expressly addressing the issue, the Marshall 
Court recognized that, while treaties are generally viewed as 
contract between two states that require execution by the sovereign 
power of the respective states, in the United States a “different 
principle” is established, according to which treaties are to be 
regarded as equivalent to acts of the legislature, so long as the 
treaty can “operate of itself, without the aid of any legislative 
provision.”223  This notion of treaties that operate by themselves is 
the source of the doctrine of self-execution.224  But when does a 
treaty operate of itself?  Carlos Vázquez contends that the effect of 
the “different principle” under U.S. law is to create a presumption 
of self-execution, unless the parties make clear through treaty 
language a contrary intent.225  Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion 
accepts that presumption, providing that a treaty is self-executing 
                                                 
219
  Id. 
220
  Id. 
221
  Id. at 277. 
222
  Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion loses sight of this dynamic in Justice 
Iredell’s Ware opinion when Justice Breyer relies on that opinion to suggest that 
treaties that address certain subject matters address themselves to the political 
branches.  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Iredell’s 
position, as Justice Breyer himself presents it, is that the question of whether or 
not a treaty addresses itself to a particular department of the government is 
rendered moot by the Supremacy Clause. 
223
  Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
224
  Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 701. 
225
 Id. at 703 (suggesting that parties can alter the rule in favor of self-
execution by providing in the treaty that rights and liabilities of individuals 
arising from the treaty will be established though subsequent legislative acts). 
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“unless it specifically contemplates execution by the legislature 
and thereby ‘addresses itself to the political, not the judicial 
department.’”226  This suggests that, contrary to the Majority’s 
approach, the question of whether or not a treaty requires 
legislative action before it can be binding domestic law 
enforceable in U.S. courts should turn on the intent of the parties to 
the treaty. 
The approved method for determining the intent of the parties 
to an international agreement is set forth in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLoT).  Although the United States has 
not ratified VCLoT, it is generally recognized as embodying 
principles of customary international law227 which are binding on 
the United States.228  Both the U.S. Department of State,229 and 
federal courts have recognized that VCLoT codifies customary 
international law.230 Courts have repeatedly recognized its 
                                                 
226
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster, 2 Pet. 
at 314).  Justice Breyer also notes Justice Baldwin’s remark that “’it would be a 
bold proposition’ to assert ‘that an act of Congress must be first passed’ in order 
to give a treaty effect as ‘a supreme law of the land.’”  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 
1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Lessee of Pollared’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 14 
Pet. 353, 388 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring)). 
227
  See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 811 & n. 3 (5th ed., 2003) 
(citing ICJ cases recognizing VCLoT as relecting customary international law). 
228
  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2764 (2004) (recognizing 
that violations of customary international law are enforceable in U.S. courts 
without the need for congressional action); The Paquete Habana, 20 S.Ct. 290, 
299 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.”). 
229
  See Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 298 (1988) (citing Robert 
Dalton, Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty affairs within the Department of 
State, who said that the U.S. relied on VCLoT for dealing with many day-to-day 
treaty problems, and Secretary of State Roger’s report to the President, 
characterizing VCLoT as “the authoritative guide to current treaty law and 
practice”). 
230
  See Avero Belgium Ins. v. American Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 
2005) (relying on VCLoT as an “authoritative guide” to the customary 
international law of treaties); Chubb & Sons v. Asiana Airlines, 215 F.3d 301, 
308 (2000) (characterizing VCLoT as a restatement of customary rules which 
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authority as embodying customary international law with respect to 
treaty interpretation specifically.231 
VCLoT provides that a treaty must be “interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.” 232  Included in VCLoT’s conception of “context” are the 
text of the treaty, including any preambles or annexes,233 any 
related agreements,234 or related instruments.235  In addition, in 
interpreting a treaty, an adjudicatory body must take into account 
subsequent agreements236 and practice, 237 as well as relevant rules 
of international law. 238  In case the interpretation arrived at 
through this method is ambiguous or obscure239 or manifestly 
unreasonable,240 that interpretation may be confirmed, or the 
meaning may be determined through the use of supplementary 
materials, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its drafting. 241 
                                                                                                             
bind states whether or not they are parties to the treaty); Aquamar, S.A. v. Del 
Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1296 n. 40 (11th Cir.1999) 
(“Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it regards 
the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention as codifying the 
international law of treaties.”) (citations omitted).  More specifically, see 
Weinberger v. Rossi, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 1514, n. 5 (1982) (citing Article 2(1)(a) as 
codifying customary international law). 
231
  See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549, 2569 (1993) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Article 31.1. as a codification of custom); 
Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir.1997) (citing 
Articles 31 and 32 as embodying customary international law), rev'd on other 
grounds, 119 S.Ct. 662 (1999).  See also SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 811 & n. 
4 (citing numerous international tribunals that have recognized the authority of 
VCLoT’s rules for interpretation of treaties). 
232
  VCLoT, Art. 31(1). 
233
  Id., Art. 31(2). 
234
  Id. Art. 31(2)(a). 
235
  Id., Art. 31(2)(b). 
236
  Id., Art. 31(3)(a). 
237
  Id., Art. 31(3)(b). 
238
  Id., Art. 31(3)(c). 
239
  Id., Art. 32(a). 
240
  Id., Art. 32(b). 
241
  Id., Art. 32. 
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In Air France v. Saks,242 the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted 
the Warsaw Convention on International Air Transport in a manner 
consistent with VCLoT.  The Court began with a thorough 
investigation of the relevant provisions of the Convention in both 
English243 and in French,244 the language of their drafting, as 
required under VCLoT.245  The Court then proceeded to a 
discussion of the negotiating history of the relevant provisions246 
and the conduct of the parties to the Convention with respect to 
those provisions, which also entailed a discussion of the parties’ 
subsequent interpretations of the provisions. 247  Finally, the Court 
consulted subsequent agreements among the parties to determine if 
those agreements indicated an intention to depart from the original 
meaning of the Convention.248  Neither the Majority nor the dissent 
engage in this sort of careful assessment of the intended meaning 
of the treaties at issue in Medellín. 
Neither the Majority nor the dissenting opinion in Medellín are 
exemplary in terms of their adherence to the generally recognized 
rules for treaty interpretation.  Indeed, perhaps conceding that this 
is the sort of activity worth doing only if it can be done well, none 
of the Justices make much of an effort to discern the object and 
purpose of the relevant treaties.  Still, the dissent does a far better 
job of considering the original meaning of the relevant 
constitutional provision and its role in our constitutional history. 
Although the Justices who joined the Majority opinion prefer to 
ride under the banners of originalism and judicial restraint, the 
Medellín Majority’s position betrays both of those causes.  The 
Majority pays no attention to the original meaning of the 
Supremacy Clause, and it frustrates the federal executive by 
thwarting its attempt to comply with an international obligation.  
Instead, the Majority permits the courts of the State of Texas to 
                                                 
242
  105 S.Ct. 1339 (1985) 
243
  Id. at 1341-42 
244
  Id. at 1342-43 
245
  VCLoT, Art. 33. 
246
  Air France, 105 S.Ct. at 1343-44 
247
  Id. at 1344-45. 
248
  Id. at 1346. 
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place the United States in violation of an international judgment 
with which the federal government sought to comply. 
V.  WHAT REMAINS 
Medellín’s case never should have come before the Supreme 
Court.  President Bush intervened in Medellín’s case through the 
President’s Memorandum in what turned out to be a failed attempt 
to comply with an international judgment, in keeping with the 
United States’ international obligations and the President’s 
understanding of his constitutional authority over foreign affairs.  
This Part argues that the President’s efforts were unsuccessful 
because they were insincere.249  The President has a duty to take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.250  This Part will first 
develop an argument for how the President, pursuant to the 
obligations attendant to the Take Care Clause, can take effective 
action to prevent cases such as Medellín from arising.   
Some have arged that the Take Care Clause mandates that 
“[t]he President should be able to do what is necessary to execute 
the supreme law of the land by overriding a state law or procedure 
that, if carried out, would cause the United States to violate the 
treaty.”251  In its strongest form, this reading of the Take Care 
                                                 
249
  See Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. at 372 (noting 
that the Bush administration “purports to implement Avena” while also claiming 
that doing so is optional and that the ICJ decision misreads the VCCR).   John 
Cerone has neatly expressed the peculiarity of the Bush administration’s actions: 
U.S. President George W. Bush has intervened (1) on 
behalf of a (non-white-collar) criminal defendant, (2) in a 
death penalty case, (3) in Texas, (4) invoking principles of 
comity, (5) with reference to an international legal obligation 
o[f] the United States, (6) as determined by an international 
court, (7) in a judgment that penetrates deeply into the 
domestic criminal justice system, (8) of Texas. 
 What’s not wrong with this picture? 
Cerone, Making Sense of the U.S. President’s Intervention in Medellín, 31 SUFF. 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 277, 277 (2008).  
250
  U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
251
  Frederic L. Kirgis, International Law in the American Courts - The United 
States Supreme Court Declines to Enforce the I.C.J.'S Avena Judgment Relating 
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Clause would support the view that the President’s Memorandum 
ordering states to implement the Avena decision should be given 
the force of law.252  One need not go so far.  The Court has not 
held that the Take Care Clause does not empower the President to 
override state law.253  But the Take Care Clause still gives rise to a 
constitutional duty to work with Congress to override state law.  
This Part concludes with a brief discussion of the U.S. executive’s 
on-going failure to Take Care that the ICJ’s Avena decision is 
implemented as required under both international and domestic law 
pursuant to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter. 
A. Implementing Treaties through the Take Care Clause 
Medellín and his amici were loathe to rely on the Take Care 
Clause in arguing that President Bush had constitutional power to 
direct state courts to implement the Avena judgment.254  That was 
likely an appropriate decision for litigation purposes, since the 
powers associated with the Take Care Clause have not been well 
established in the case law.255  But there are relatively simple 
measures that the President can take, in accordance with the 
executive’s constitutional powers, to ensure U.S. compliance with 
its treaty obligations. 
                                                                                                             
to a U.S. Obligation under the Convention on Consular Relations, 9 GERM. L. J. 
619, 631 (2008). 
252
  Not surprisingly, Medellín’s attorneys made this argument in their opening 
brief in the Supreme Court.  See Brief for Petitioner, at 17, Medellín v. Texas, 
No. 06-984 (U.S. June 28 2007) (“Both historical practice and this Court’s 
decisions make clear that this authority affords the President discretion to 
determine the means of enforcement of statutes and treaties to the extent not 
specified by Congress or the treaty, and to take such other steps as may be 
necessary to ensure that the powers that the Constitution gives to the federal 
government can be carried into effect.”). 
253
  See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. at 1372 (finding that the Take Care Clause 
“allows the President to execute laws, not make them). 
254
  See Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. at 341 (noting 
that the Take Care Clause plays a “bit part in debates over presidential 
authority” and that Medellín considered reliance on the Take Care Clause 
unnecessary “in light of the President’s well-established foreign affairs 
powers”). 
255
  See id. at 335 (noting that reliance on the Take Care clause has fallen out of 
favor). 
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Quite simply, the President’s duty under the Take Care Clause 
requires that the executive branch draft whatever legislation is 
necessary to implement all treaty obligations to the extent that 
those obligations are not self-executing.  Before elaborating on this 
thesis, however, we must first entertain a few objections to this 
reading of the Take Care Clause. 
First, there is some controversy over whether the Take Care 
Clause, which refers to “the Laws” and does not mention treaties, 
entails a duty of the President to faithfully execute treaties.256  Still, 
the overwhelming majority of scholars who have touched on the 
issue have concluded that the Framers intended to include both 
congressional laws and treaties in the “Laws” to be executed under 
the Take Care Clause.257  Whatever the views of the Framers, 
courts have generally adopted the view that “the Laws” 
encompassed within the Take Care Clause include treaties.258  The 
Supreme Court endorsed this view in In re Neagle259 and again in 
United States v. Midwest Oil Co.260  Indeed, even the boldest 
advocates of unilateral executive authority concede that the 
                                                 
256
  See id. at 343 (conceding that the question of treaties’ status under the Take 
Care clause is not “free from doubt”). 
257
  See id. at 343-46 (assembling key statements from the Framers expressing 
the view that the President’s Take Care duties includes a duty to execute 
treaties); Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J.  at 1232 (finding no 
textual or historical basis for the claim that the Take Care Clause applies only to 
statutes); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva 
Conventions? 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004) (concluding that the Take Care 
Clause entails a presidential duty to execute treaties).  But see MICHAEL J. 
GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 203 (1990) (contending that the Take 
Care Clause only applies to laws enacted by the legislature). 
258
  Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. at 347. 
259
  10 S.Ct. 658, 668 (1890) (implying through a rhetorical question that the 
duties arising from the Take Care Clause entail “the rights, duties, and 
obligations growing out of the constitution itself, our international relations, and 
all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the 
constitution”).  
260
  35 S.Ct. 309, 325 (1915) (stating that the President’s duties under the Take 
Care Clause entail “’the rights and obligations growing out of the Constitution 
itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of 
the government under the Constitution’”) (quoting Neagle). 
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President may not refuse to enforce a treaty in force because to do 
so would violate the Take Care Clause.261 
 Next, some have argued that because non-self-executing 
treaties are not Supreme Law, they are excluded from the ambit of 
the Take Care Clause.262  Rather, non-self executing treaties are to 
be executed by Congress, thus relieving the President of his Take 
Care duties.263  The claim is a peculiar one, given the widely-
acknowledged confusion regarding what constitutes a non-self-
executing treaty.264  Moreover, since the distinction between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties is not of constitutional 
origin,265 it is hard to use that distinction as a means of specifying 
the ambit of the Take Care Clause.  One way to reconcile the 
constitutional text, which states that all treaties are supreme law, 
with our practice, in which non-self-executing treaties are not 
given that effect as supreme law, is to characterize non-self-
executing treaties as non-justiciable – that is, supreme law but, 
until executed, not a source of judicially-enforceable rights.266  
This is an elegant solution, but it turns on agreement on the 
meaning of “non-self-executing,” and no such agreement exists.267 
The objection is not a huge impediment to the argument of this 
Article.  Those who take issue with the President’s power to take 
                                                 
261
  Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., and Robert J. 
Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to Hon. William H. Taft, 
IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State 4 (Jan. 14, 2002), available at 
http://www.cartoonbank.com/newyorker/slideshows/02YooTaft.pdf (last visited 
July 16, 2008). 
262
  See, e.g., Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign 
Relations Law, 116 YALE L. J. 1230, 1261 (2007) (contending that the President 
has no duty to take care that non-self-executing treaties are faithfully executed); 
Michael P. van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs 
Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 334 (2006) (“If a particular treaty does not 
create of its own force a directly cognizable federal law right, obligation, or 
power, there is nothing – at least not yet – for the president to ‘execute’ under 
the Take Care Clause”). 
263
  Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J.  at 1232. 
264
  See supra note 170. 
265
  See supra note 165. 
266
  Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J.  at 1233. 
267
  See supra note 170. 
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care that a non-self-executing treaty is faithfully executed have in 
mind a positive power to execute the laws.268  Here, we are only 
concerned with a presidential duty to take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed.  For our purposes, there is no need to show that 
the President could, through the exercise of some variety of Article 
II power, give domestic effect to a non-self-executing treaty.  It is 
enough if the Take Care Clause mandates that the President 
undertake legal or political measures to effectuate such treaties as 
domestic law.   
The Take Care Clause is not a grant of additional enforcement 
or execution powers to the President.  Rather, as Joseph Story put 
it, “the true interpretation of the clause is, that the President is to 
use all such means as the Constitution and laws have placed at his 
disposal to enforce the due execution of the laws.”269  The point is 
that the President may not choose to enforce some laws and not 
others.270  In addition, although the Take Care Clause is not a 
source of new presidential powers not otherwise delegated in 
Article II, it is an exhortation to the President to promote full 
compliance with the law, not only by the executive branch but by 
all arms of the government.271  
B. Avena, Medellín and the Way Forward  
In at least some respects, the Medellín opinion provides clear 
guidance.  The Supreme Court has clearly found that the treaties at 
issue in the case are non-self-executing and that the President’s 
Memorandum is insufficient to override state law.  If the President 
is serious about implementing the Avena decision, the State of 
                                                 
268
  See Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. at 362 
(contending that the Supreme Court has recognized that the Take Care Clause 
entails executive powers as well as duties). 
269
 JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 292, 178 (1854).  See also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE 
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 124 (2007) (“[T]he take –care 
clause . . . is phrased as a duty, not a power; it does not give the President 
authority to enforce the law but only imposes the obligation to use other 
presidential powers to that end.”). 
270
  Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. at 360. 
271
  Id. at 370. 
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Texas itself, in its Medellín merits brief, made clear what the 
executive needs to do: it needs to coordinate with Congress or the 
States.272  Texas first suggests that the President could work with 
Congress to create a federal exception to the state procedural rule 
that bars successive habeas petitions in cases involving violations 
of the VCCR.273  Texas next recommends that the President could 
simply enter into a bilateral agreement with Mexico requiring 
federal judicial review of the cases addressed in Avena.274  Finally, 
Texas proposes an executive panel to provide the “review and 
reconsideration” require under Avena.  Any findings of actual 
prejudice could be communicated to state pardon and parole 
boards along with a presidential request that the panel’s 
recommendation “be given great weight in state clemency 
proceedings.”275   
Of these options, only the first has any meaningful opportunity 
of rendering Avena enforceable in U.S. courts.  A bilateral 
agreement with Mexico would be no more self-executing than the 
U.N. Charter.  In connection with its proposal that the President 
establish an executive panel to provide review and reconsideration 
of cases like Medellín’s, Texas has stated that it would be willing 
to “accord considerable weight” to executive findings of 
prejudice.276 This assertion is hard to credit, given that past 
requests from branches of the federal government in the context of 
VCCR litigation have gone unheeded.  For example, the Governor 
of Virginia proceeded with the execution of Angel Francisco 
Breard, despite Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s request 
urging him to await a ruling by the ICJ.277   Nor has the State of 
Texas been moved by Justice Stevens’ arguments that the Court’s 
Medellín judgment does nothing to foreclose Texas from assuming 
the minimal costs involved in granting Medellín the review and 
reconsideration required by the Avena decision.278  Indeed, on 
                                                 
272
  Brief for Respondent, at 46, Medellín v. Texas, No. 06-984 (Aug. 2007) 
273
  Id. 
274
  Id. 
275
  Id. at 46-47.   
276
  Id. at 47, n.32. 
277
  See supra note 50.   
278
  Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1374-75 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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August 5, 2008, Texas executed Medellín, after the Supreme 
Court, in a 5-4 decision, refused to order a stay of execution.279 
The Bush administration contends that it has intervened most 
forcefully on behalf of the Avena defendants.  The President’s 
Memorandum was, in and of itself, extraordinary.280  In both state 
court proceedings and in the federal courts, the Bush 
administration also filed amicus briefs on behalf of Medellín and 
other Avena defendants.281 In addition, since the Court’s ruling in 
Medellín, the Bush administration continued to attempt to persuade 
Texas to grant review and reconsideration of Medellín’s case,282 
until Medellín’s execution. 
Although Medellín’s case ended with is life, the Avena case 
continues.  On June 5, 2008, Mexico filed with the ICJ a Request 
for Interpretation of Judgment in the Avena Case283 and a request 
for provisional measures.284  In that context, it is striking that the 
Bush Administration has taken no steps to work with Congress 
towards implementing the Avena decision, as that is precisely the 
course of action prescribed by the Medellín Majority. During oral 
proceedings in the most recent ICJ case, Judge Bennouna asked the 
State Department’s Legal Advisor, John Bellinger, about the views 
of the United States Congress on the Avena judgment.  Mr. 
Bellinger responded as follows: 
                                                 
279
 James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections, N. Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2008).   
280
  See Verbatim Record, Oral Proceedings in the Case Concerning the Request 
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (United Mexican States v. United States of 
America) (Remarks of John Bellinger, June 19, 2008), ¶ 9, at 11. 
 
281
  See id., ¶¶ 10, 13-14, at 11-13. 
282
  See id., ¶ 21, at 16. 
283
  Request for the Interpretation of the Judgment of March 31 2004 in the 
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (United Mexican States 
v. United States of America), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/139/14582.pdf (last visited July 17, 2008). 
284
  Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14582.pdf (last visited 
July 17, 2008). 
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Congress has not in fact adopted legislation on this issue, 
so there is no real way for me to represent to you the 
view of our “Congress” as such….  It is worth noting 
though that – even assuming a large number of 
individual Members of Congress might agree that the 
Avena decision is binding as a matter of international 
law – it does not necessarily mean that Congress would 
adopt legislation on the point.  Congress is a political 
body, and the actions of Members of Congress can be 
affected by a wide range of factors.285   
True enough, but one of those factors is whether or not the 
executive branch is pressuring Members of Congress to pass a 
particular piece of legislation.  That is not happening under the 
current administration.286 
The treaties at issue in Medellín are not the only ones that are 
in need of domestic implementation.  The United States routinely 
attaches “Reservations, Understandings and Declarations” to the 
human rights treaties it ratifies declaring them to be non-self-
executing.287  There is nothing wrong with this practice in and of 
itself, but some human rights treaties specify that signatories must 
take all measures necessary to implement their substantive 
provisions as domestic law. 288   By declaring these provisions to 
                                                 
285
  See Verbatim Record, Oral Proceedings in the Case Concerning the Request 
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (United Mexican States v. United States of 
America) (Remarks of John Bellinger, June 20, 2008), 12 at ¶ 17 . 
286
  Bellinger explains the government’s inaction as follows: “Given the short 
legislative calendar for our Congress this year, it would not be possible for both 
houses of our Congress to pass legislation to give the President authority to 
implement the Avena decision.  There is simply not enough time.  Verbatim 
Record, ¶ 26, at 17 (Remarks of John Bellinger, June 19, 2008). 
287
  David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 
139-42 (1999).       
288
  See, e.g., The International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 
2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (“[E]ach State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to effect to the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”); The United Nations Convention 
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be non-self executing and then not executing them, the United 
States effectively renders its participation in the treaty regime 
meaningless for domestic purposes, since domestic courts dismiss 
individual claims brought under such human rights treaties on the 
basis that the treaties at issue are not self- executing and/or do not 
create a private right of action.289  U.S. Presidents’ failure to abide 
by their take care duties places the United States in on-going 
violation of multiple treaty duties.   
For example, the Human Rights Committee, tasked with 
interpreting and enforcing the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, released a general comment in which it stated that 
Article 2 of the Covenant “requires that States Parties take the 
necessary steps to give effect to the Covenant rights in the 
domestic order.”290  Given the United States declaration that 
substantive provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing, 
coupled with its failure to execute the relevant provisions, the 
Human Rights Committee’s comment indicates that the United 
States is currently in violation of its obligations under the 
Covenant.  
On July 16, 2008, by a vote of 7-5, the ICJ ordered the United 
States to take “all measures necessary to ensure” that five Mexican 
nationals, including Medellín are not executed pending judgment 
on Mexico’s Request for Interpretation, unless they are accorded 
the review and reconsideration called for in the Avena judgment.291  
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This new order accords the executive a compelling opportunity to 
approach Congress to find a way out of this international impasse.  
The Take Care Clause is unlikely to provide the basis for any legal 
claim that the President has failed in his constitutional duties.  
Rather, the mechanisms for the enforcement of the Take Care 
Clause are political: the impeachment process and the ballot 
box.292  And so, the best way to encourage the executive to abide 
by its Take Care duties may be organizing at the grass roots level 
and through professional organizations, such as the American Bar 
Association and the American Society of International Law, that 
can put pressure on the United States Department of State to make 
the full implementation of treaties a domestic priority.293 
CONCLUSION 
It’s always bad when the Supreme Court makes an unreasoned 
decision.  From that perspective, Medellín is no better or worse 
than other decisions in which the Court’s self-proclaimed 
originalists have departed from their allegiance to the Constitution 
in favor of their own agendas.  But Medellín is uniquely important 
because it is the first Supreme Court decision that proclaims that 
there are to be no domestic consequences when the U.S. violates 
its international obligations.  The case sends a strong message to 
the United States’s trading partners that it cannot be counted on.  
This regrettable decision may nonetheless result in a public good.  
It provides the opportunity for a new administration, in reliance on 
its Take Care Clause duties, to work aggressively with a new 
Congress to promote the United States’ full participation in and 
compliance with the treaties that it has ratified.  
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